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ABSTRACT
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This thesis examines how the Central Intelligence Agency and the U.S. State Department
differed in their approaches to dealing with the Castro regime from 1959 through the
aftermath of the Bay of Pigs Invasion. Using declassified documents from the CIA and
State Department, I argue that the approaches of the CIA in dealing with the Castro
regime were more aggressive than the approaches of the U.S. State Department. Many
of the primary sources used in this work were accessed in the CIA electronic reading
room and on the office of the historian website. The office of the historian is an official
government office within the Bureau of Public Affairs responsible for publishing
declassified historical documents related to U.S. foreign policy. The thesis contributes to
the historiography of U.S.-Cuban relations by exposing tensions and rifts inside the U.S.
government during a pivotal era in the history of both nations.
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Introduction

Cuba has long been a nation dominated by foreign powers. Spain and the United
States have both exerted their influence over the island nation. Spain was first from
early 1500s to 1898 and the United States became more involved in Cuba after the
Cubans organized an independence movement against Spain. Over the course of the
twentieth century the United States and Cuba had a dynamic relationship. This
relationship was most tumultuous after Fidel Castro took power and the United States
government agencies were divided on the issue of how to most effectively deal with the
Castro Regime. In my thesis, I argue that the CIA had more aggressive foreign policy
strategies for Cuba than did the State Department from 1959 through the Cuban Missile
Crisis. Prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion, the CIA had more of a hand in guiding policy.
However, after the Bay of Pigs failure, much of that changed. The rise, of Fidel Castro
was the spark that ignited the turbulent relationship between the United States and
Cuba. His rise was rooted in a long Cuban struggle against imperialism.
When Christopher Columbus first encountered the island in 1492, he described
it as the most beautiful land he had ever looked upon. As it turned out, Columbus was
not alone in his admiration of the land we today call Cuba. For more than four centuries
Spain guarded Cuba as one of its prized possessions due to all of its resources. The
island’s Spanish rulers dubbed the island “the Pearl of the Antilles,” as it was the largest
island in the Caribbean and centrally located, making it exceptionally valuable in the
sphere of global trade.1
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Cubans, however, became increasingly dissatisfied with colonial rule and in the
early 1880s began to speak about organizing an independence movement which would
free them from Spanish colonial rule.2 However, not all Cubans wanted independence.
There was a group of Creole elites called “the autonomists” who supported maintaining
a colonial relationship with Spain because they feared decolonization would result in
economic instability for Cuba.3 As the autonomists feared, the Cuban economy did
indeed destabilize, but not due to decolonization. Instead, the economy was negatively
affected by a drop in sugar production in Cuba during the Ten Years war from1868 to
1878.4 The damaged economy was enough for some autonomists to accept the idea of
fighting for independence.
A Cuban journalist and poet named Jose Martí organized a sophisticated
independence movement by mobilizing Cubans who were in favor of independence. His
forces included Cubans living on the island along with members of the Cuban diaspora
who fled Cuba and settled in American cities like New York and Tampa. The
independence war began in 1895 and raged on through 1897. Initially the insurrection
was little more than a few isolated skirmishes, but it developed into a revolution which
demanded Spain’s attention. Spain sent troops to put down the rebellion, but the Cuban
independence movement persisted. After two years of fighting Spain granted Cuba
limited autonomy on January 1, 1898. 5
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Cuba was freer than it had ever historically been from imperialist and colonial
interests. However, officials in the U.S. government capitalized on Cuba’s vulnerable
position by staging the explosion of the USS Maine in Havana harbor. The destruction
of the Maine was conveniently blamed on Spain, and thus was able to intervene in
Spanish/Cuban relations and “free” Cuba entirely from colonial rule. The intervention in
Spanish/Cuban relations at such a critical point in Cuba’s history enabled the United
States to position itself as Cuba’s rescuer and thus make demands from their newly
acquired ally.
Once Cuba was mostly under U.S. control, they quickly drafted the Platt
Amendment which ensured the United States permanent access to Cuba and the right
to intervene in Cuba’s governmental affairs. The nation went through a series of puppet
governments controlled remotely from Washington, D.C. American businesses were
established in Cuba and flourished throughout the first half of the twentieth century.
Americans built homes in Cuba and the island became one of the top American tourist
destinations. The relationship Cuba had with the United States caused the Cuban
economy to boom due to new global trading opportunities, increased tourism, and
industrial development. By the 1950s, however, there was substantial discontent in the
country. The leaders were corrupt and led with their own best interests in mind, rather
than the interests of the nation. The rich became richer, while most of the peasants
were illiterate, unskilled workers with no access to health care.
A revolution was born from the discontent felt by many Cubans. A revolutionary
force led by Fidel Castro developed in the early 1950s and erupted in an attack on July
26, 1953. The Castro brothers and roughly 140 rebels attacked the Moncada barracks,
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a federal Garrison in Santiago de Cuba, in an effort to spark a revolution. The
revolutionary leaders identified the barracks as an ideal place to launch the revolution
because the barracks had massive amounts of weapons. Therefore, if the attack were
successful, the revolution would have acquired a multitude of firearms to add to their
stock.6
The revolutionaries, however, were unsuccessful. Some of the men were
executed, but Fidel Castro was put on trial and given the opportunity to defend his
actions. It was in these hearings that Fidel Castro delivered his most famous speech:
History will Absolve Me. In the four-hour speech, Castro attempted to defend himself by
justifying his revolutionary ideals and criticizing Fulgencio Batista, the dictator of Cuba in
1953. Castro stated in his speech “we set out to fight for Cuba’s freedom and we are not
ashamed for having done so.”7 Castro was found guilty of conspiring and staging an
attack and was sentenced to fifteen years in prison. Of those fifteen years he served
less than two as Batista released a slew of political prisoners as a result of international
pressures asking him to do so. Therefore, Fidel Castro was free. Castro and his
revolutionaries had indeed lost the battle at the Moncada barracks but would reemerge
in 1959 to win the war.
This work examines the roots of Cuba’s conflict with the United States starting
with the first Cuba’s Revolution from Spain in 1898 and concluding with the close of the
Cuban Missile crisis in 1962. However, in order to understand events in this era, it is
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vital to understand the earlier history of Cuba and its relationship to the United States.
Castro may have never risen to power in the first place had it not been for the imperial
relationship between the United States and Cuba. Thus, the first chapter opens with a
discussion on how America became invested in Cuba and what the United States had
to lose from a revolutionary movement like that of Fidel Castro’s. The first chapter lays
the framework for many of the conflicts that came to a head in the early sixties, and still
haunt the United States and Cuba today.
The second chapter outlines the rise of a new regime in Cuba. What started out
as a laughable rebellion in the Sierra Maestra mountains quickly gained traction and
became a widely known and feared rebel group. Those rebels were led by Fidel Castro,
his brother Raúl Castro, and his partner Ernesto “Che” Guevara. The regime made their
way from the southeastern region of Cuba toward Havana. They successfully overthrew
the Batista regime and declared victory on January 1, 1959. U.S. government officials
were certainly threatened by Fidel Castro and his rebels, because the U.S. supported
the Batista regime. It is an understatement to say that they were perturbed by the
Cuban Revolution and its new leaders.
The third chapter outlines the controversy in approaches on dealing with Castro,
within different agencies in the United States. As officials in the United States
government adjusted to the changing state of affairs in Cuba, some agencies developed
negative views about the new revolutionary leader. This was largely due to the fact that
Castro condemned imperialism and argued that Cuba could never be truly free if its
government continued to be monitored, influenced and driven by the United States. The
U.S. was however comforted by the fact that Castro preached democratic ideals and
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valued the voting and elections process. For example, in January of 1959 Castro
claimed that Cuba would have no more dictators and stated in a BBC interview, “I would
think that in 18 months, about, we will have free elections.”8
Castro also preached other ideals. He valued things like education and literacy,
accessible health care, and national pride. One of the most notable aspects of Castro’s
speeches was his ability to communicate his nationalist ideals without sounding like a
crazed, power hungry hypnotist who forced his people to adopt his beliefs. His
speeches were peaceful yet strong. In examining Castro’s speeches, it becomes
evident how he was able to appeal to the masses. He identifies the people as the heart
and soul of the revolution in an effort to encourage people to relate to the movement
and develop a sense of ownership of the movement. As the people began to feel
validated and feel like they were part of something bigger than themselves, the
population quickly developed a heightened sense of nationalism. In his speeches,
Castro demonstrated a dedication to his countrymen and demanded justice, freedom,
and human rights for all Cubans, not only the members of the privileged class, which he
argued was the case with Batista in office.
His anti-imperialist rhetoric, however, quickly turned into actions that U.S. policy
makers perceived as hostile toward American interests. Conflicts between the two
nations developed early on. Castro instituted an agrarian reform in the summer of 1959,
which was arguably the spark of the conflict between the United States and Cuba. He

8 Fidel Castro, Fidel Castro on his beard, Free Elections & Gambling, (1959, London:
BBC News), YouTube, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iDZ5GyVDqOc.
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aimed to redistribute land that belonged to wealthy farmers and plantation owners,
including Americans, to peasants who could work the land to provide for their families.
While Castro believed the outcome of his policies would benefit his people and raise the
standard of living for average Cubans, U.S. officials interpreted his new programs and
legislation as acts of aggression toward U.S. businesses and the U.S. government. The
Agrarian Reform went into effect on June 3, 1959. What followed was a battle of tug of
war between the United States and Cuba. First, U.S businessmen and policy makers
protested Castro’s agrarian reform, then Castro reduced the amount of money Cuba
paid to the American owned Cuban Electric Company. The decrease in revenue was
answered with U.S. bombs being dropped over Cuban sugar mills in the country side.
The bombings pushed Castro to expropriate 70,000 acres of property owned by U.S.
companies. The United States government then embarked on a series of protests which
only worsened the heated situation.9
United States officials refused to allow Castro to make changes in Cuba if those
changes came at the expense of American property. Therefore, as Castro embarked on
more and more expropriation campaigns, U.S. officials and property owners became
increasingly infuriated with him. When Castro entered into trade agreements with
countries in the Eastern Hemisphere, such as the Soviet Union, United States officials
were more threatened than ever.
Even after Castro developed left-leaning policies and made economic
agreements with the Soviet bloc, Castro still maintained that he was not a communist.
By the time Castro did declare himself a communist and produce a socialist constitution
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for his nation on May 1, 1963, the U.S. government had already turned against him.
U.S. officials perhaps believed that Castro’s actions spoke louder than his words.
Several members and agencies of the U.S. government had long been concerned that
Cuba would fall to communism. Therefore, it came as little surprise when it did.
Chapter four and five of this thesis explores the relationship between Cuba and
the United States under the Kennedy administration. The Kennedy administration took
over the plans drafted during the Eisenhower administration. In both 1959 and 1960
plans by U.S. government agencies were set in motion to combat what U.S. officials
perceived to be direct aggression from Fidel Castro. The State Department and the CIA
were the two main contributors of strategies on how to deal with the Cuban “problem”
during the early years of the Castro regime. The two agencies competed with one
another to craft the most cunning and effective plans for destabilizing Cuba; plans which
Kennedy executed quickly after becoming president.
This thesis argues that the CIA’s plans and strategies for dealing with the Castro
regime were more aggressive than the plans devised by the State Department. The
CIA drafted plans for an invasion of Cuba even when some argued that Cuba posed
little threat at all to the United States. Even after their first plan, “Operation Zapata” or
the “Bay of Pigs” as it is commonly known, failed miserably, the CIA still did not alter
their strategy. They instead designed another plan, “Operation Mongoose,” which
consisted of propaganda initiatives, another land invasion and assassination plots
against Fidel Castro.
In contrast to the CIA, the State Department used different methods to deal with
the Cuban situation. They argued for the use of economic warfare rather than military
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warfare. They tried to destabilize Cuba by using more peaceful methods and strategies.
The State Department was by no means friendly to Fidel Castro or members of his
revolution, but they certainly opposed an attack on the nation. They focused their
energies on propaganda, infiltration, and economic sabotage. The details of strategies
proposed by the CIA and the State department are analyzed in Chapter 3, in a
discussion of cutthroat economics versus military force.
From the time Castro rose to power in 1959 through the Cuban Missile Crisis of
1962 neither the CIA nor the State Department altered their strategies much. The
passage of time and the worsening relationship between Washington and Havana did
not seem to be catalysts for change. Once the CIA and the State Department developed
their approaches, they maintained those approaches in most instances from the start of
Castro’s revolution through the Cuban Missile Crisis.
My research relies on documents from each agency to track the decisions made
from the beginning of the Castro administration through the Cuban missile crisis.
Records from the CIA include estimates, memorandums, weekly summary reports and
other documents from CIA declassified files. The documents lend insight on vital pieces
of information like how the CIA felt about Castro, the CIA’s evaluation of Cuba’s
relationship with the Soviet Union, and outlook for future relations between the United
States in Cuba.
The State Department’s documents from this period indicate that the State
Department took a different approach toward Castro between 1959 and 1962. While
the State Department documents illuminate intricate propaganda schemes and plans of
economic sabotage, they also demonstrate the State Department's willingness to work
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with Cuba. In certain instances, the State Department even listed expectations which
Cuba needed to meet in order to continue to pursue a diplomatic relationship with
Castro’s revolutionary regime. These documents indicate that the State Department
attempted to influence the revolutionary government, and State Department officials
seem to have had some hope for mending the damaged relationship. I argue that such
documents tell a story that is often missed in the historiography of U.S. Cuban relations:
a story of attempts at compromise between two antagonistic nations.
Though these two agencies operated within the same country, they had vastly
different ideals and methods in regard to handling foreign relations. This thesis aims to
examine the stance of the Central Intelligence agency and the position of the State
Department in their dealings with Cuba from the start of the Castro administration
through the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs.

10

Historiography

The historiography of U.S./Cuban relations is vast. Scholars have used many
different approaches in their study of U.S. Cuban relations, but the relationship between
the State Department and the CIA has been underexplored. This work aims to compare
the differences between the CIA’s approach and the State Department’s approach to
Cuban affairs between 1959 and the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961.
A useful chronological guide for this research is Jane Franklin’s Cuba and the
U.S. Empire. Franklin does not propose an argument in her work. The book offers a day
by day chronology of Cuba’s important events from 1492 up to the twenty first century.
Franklin’s work serves as a valuable reference guide for dates and events. She devotes
substantial attention to the CIA and the State Department. Franklin also highlights key
points of the attempted assassinations against Castro. In the text Franklin describes the
uncertainty surrounding who ordered the attempted assassinations of Fidel Castro, who
was hired to carry them out, and who in the U.S. government knew about the orders.
One of the leading scholars of Cuban history, Louis Pérez, Jr., has contributed a
vast amount of literature to the historiography of U.S./Cuban relations. Two of his works
are especially relevant when discussing imperialism and comparing motives and
approaches of U.S. government agencies. In Cuba and the United States: Ties of
Singular Intimacy, Pérez argues that the United States has never been supportive of
Cuban independence importantly because of Cuba’s position in global trade routes.
Thus,
the United States government never wanted Cuba to be a free nation with sole
ownership of valuable coastal land. After the first Cuban Revolution of 1898, U.S.
11

officials did not want Cuba to be the sole owners of these resources because they
wanted to be able to construct ports for trade. In this work, Pérez traces the history
beginning with the first Cuban independence war with Spain and ending with the Cuban
Revolution. In his comments on the Cuban Revolution and the U.S. reaction to it, Pérez
explained that assassination plans for Castro and invasion plans for Cuba were both
unsuccessful due to the fact that many government officials, the CIA especially,
underestimated how much the Cuban people supported Castro.10
In Cuba in the American Imagination, Pérez states that “all that is American
Imperialism, has been practiced in Cuba.”11 Pérez’s argument in Cuba in the American
Imagination thus contends that Cuba was a preliminary run for U.S. imperialism abroad.
He argues that the United States’ actions in Cuba signaled to the world how U.S.
officials wanted America to be defined and perceived. Furthermore, U.S. actions in
Cuba exposed America’s purpose in the world. He further argues that power and
morality are linked and that the United States government tried to convince its people
that owning Cuba was a plausible goal.
Like Pérez, Michael Neagle argues in America’s Forgotten Colony that by
roughly 1915, most Americans firmly believed that the U.S. government would make
short work of acquiring Cuba. He argues that this became especially true as more
investors and land owners purchased property in Cuba. Americans expected that
ownership of Cuba by the United States would be a self-fulfilling prophecy. American
imperialism was alive and thriving in twentieth century Cuba. However, Neagle’s
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narrative is different from other scholars because he argues that Cold War issues
resulted from events in the twentieth century. He points to legislation such as the Platt
Amendment and American businessmen endorsing casinos and other outlets for vice on
the island to support his claim. However, he also argues that the relationship between
the United States and Cuba from 1898-1953 was not as adversarial as their relationship
during Castro’s rule. I challenge this assertion because I would argue the relationship
was only less adversarial from 1898-1953 because the United States occupied Cuba for
many of those years. Therefore, United States officials had less problems with the
Cuban government during this period because they ran the Cuban government and
were faced with less opposition.
Jules Benjamin’s The United States and Cuba has a similar argument to that of
Neagle in his discussion of the root cause of the United States’ adverse relationship
with Cuba. He claims that modern conflicts between the two nations are rooted in the
history of U.S. dominance over Cuba and Cuba’s resistance to that influence. Benjamin
further examines the difficulties Cuba faced as a result of its relationship to the U.S. and
effects of U.S. imperialism on the island. He also discusses the role of economics in
regard to U.S. /Cuban relations and policymaking.12
Stephen Cimbala approaches the topic of relations between the United States
and Cuba through a military lens in Military Persuasion. His main argument in the piece
is the military success during the Cold War, in Cuba, was determined mostly by how
effective the United States, the “deliverers of a threat”, were in convincing Cuba, “the
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Jules Benjamin, The United States and Cuba: Hegemony and Dependent Development,
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburg Press, 1977, xi.
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receivers of the threat,” that if certain demands or objectives were met, there would be
no military escalation.13 He comments specifically on how the CIA was ineffective at
delivering threats because their plans were insufficient when it came to Cuba and they
seriously underestimated Fidel Castro. Cimbala’s narrative is interesting because his
topic is focused on military tactics but his arguments center around diplomacy.
Lars Schoultz has a stance on the issue of foreign relations with Cuba that is
similar to that of Cimbala. Schoultz’s argument in That Infernal Little Cuban Republic
aligns with Cimbala in that it references the effort that the United States needed to
establish a policy of “nut-pinching,” as Sen. J. William Fulbright called it.14 Schoultz’s
central argument is that American ideology is deeply rooted in sixteenth-century
realism, emphasizing that the “strong do what they want, and the weak accept what
they must.” He claims that because the Bay of Pigs invasion was a failure, the United
States had to weigh its opportunity costs for an additional invasion, and the U.S.
government ultimately decided that it would be less costly to establish an embargo
against Cuba than it would be to plan and execute another invasion. 15
In the year before the Bay of Pigs invasion, President Eisenhower chose to
establish the 1960 embargo. However, though there would be no subsequent invasion,
the conversation on assassinating Fidel Castro was not entirely off the table. Schoultz
points out that the United States government, and the CIA in particular, did not halt
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assassination attempts on Fidel Castro until the late 1970s.16 Schoultz titled one of his
chapters “He’s Going to be There until He Dies,” a line most famously spoken by
President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1966. As it turns out, Johnson was correct in his
assumption that Castro would “be there until he died,” because Castro passed his
power on to his brother Raúl Castro in 2008 and succumbed to a death by natural
causes in November of 2016. A statement like “He’s going to be there until he dies”
would be a rather obvious statement if it had been made about a national leader that
U.S. officials liked and respected. However, this statement, when made about Castro,
was meant negatively. U.S. government officials tried multiple times to assassinate
Castro and were disappointed with their failure to succeed in their mission. Later
presidents also eagerly awaited Castro’s death. In 1990 Bill Clinton stated that Castro
“can’t last forever. No one lives forever. . . One day the good Lord will take Fidel Castro
away.”17
While the CIA prepared for the initial attacks against Castro’s life, President
Kennedy approved the 1960 embargo in hopes that it would cause Castro’s regime to
collapse and make way for Kennedy to bring about the demise of the Castro regime.
While the embargo certainly did damage to Cuba, the U.S. never attained its goal to
overthrow the Cuban government while Fidel was still alive. The central question of
Schoultz’s work becomes: How did Cuba prevail, despite their refusal to “accept what
they must.”

16
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William Leogrande and Peter Kornbluh’s Back Channel to Cuba provides the
reader with an account of the factors which stalled and accelerated U.S. relations with
Cuba in the 20th Century. The authors focus on unconventional ways in which
information circulated between the two countries. The main argument is that state
secrets and sensitive information were oftentimes transferred through the hands of
unlikely sources including ABC journalists and Pope Francis. Leogrande and Kornbluh
dedicate much time to the discussion of the CIA and their relationship with Cuba. They
further commented on how the assassination attempts of Fidel Castro may have been
too elaborate and that this complexity may have contributed to their failure. They
discussed the strategies for assassinations such as poisoned scuba equipment,
poisoned cigars, and contaminated pills. Lastly, they argued that the “perpetual
antagonism” between the United States and Cuba was of the “most entrenched and
enduring conflicts in the history of U.S. foreign policy.”18
I aim to explore this conflict differently than many historians and scholars have
thus far. Much scholarship has been published on the differing ideals stemming from
Washington and Havana. However, there are fewer works of scholarship that focus on
the internal tensions in the United States approach toward Cuba.
My thesis contributes to the scholarship on the history of U.S./Cuban relations
and has a specific niche because the narrative will be situated within the context of
documents produced by the CIA and the U.S. State Department. My work will be
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organized in a similar fashion to that of Michael Neagle’s, as I aim to date my research
back to the late nineteenth century.
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Chapter 1
From Colony to Puppet Government

The relevant history of the relationship between Cuba and the United States
began around the turn of the nineteenth century, during Cuba’s independence
movement from Spain. Spain colonized Cuba in the early 1500s and maintained control
of the island until 1898. Spain developed an unprecedented sugar industry in Cuba and
by the mid-1800s it became the world’s number one producer of sugar. Cuba exported
other goods like coffee and tobacco, but sugar comprised 83 percent of Cuban
exports.19
U.S. government officials, businessmen, and investors were not oblivious to the
enormous profit turned by the sugar industry in Cuba, as the United States was the
recipient of 40 percent of all exported Cuban sugar. By the late 1880s the U.S. imported
more Cuban goods than Spain. The sugar industry, coupled with Cuba’s prime location
for trade, and potential for naval bases, made Cuba an ideal subject for purchase by the
United States.
The United States government did in fact attempt to buy Cuba from the Spain
government. In fact, in 1854 under the leadership of President Franklin Pierce, the U.S.
government drafted an official document called the Ostend Manifesto which
recommended that Cuba be sold to the U.S. by Spain for the price of 130 million dollars,
the equivalent of roughly 3.5 billion dollars today. The authors of the document
suggested that if Spain refused to sell Cuba, “we shall be justified in wrestling it from

19
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Spain… upon the very same principle that would justify an individual tearing down the
burning house of his neighbor if there were no other means of preventing the flames
from destroying his home.” 20 The Ostend Manifesto was rejected by Congress and U.S.
officials put to rest the idea of purchasing Cuba from Spain. However, the issue
resurfaced in 1897 under the William McKinley administration and the United States
treasury offered Spain 300 million dollars, the equivalent to roughly 8.3 billion dollars
today, and Spain rejected the offer.21
In the years that U.S. government officials worked on persuading Spain to sell
Cuba, many Cubans mobilized and established an independence movement to free
themselves from Spanish rule. This independence movement was an extension of the
two previous wars fought between Cuban revolutionaries and Spanish soldiers. The two
wars were the Ten Years’ War from 1868-1878 and the Guerra Chiqita from 1879 to
1880.
The desire for independence in Cuba was not universal. There were
autonomists, also known as loyalists, who preferred to remain a colony of Spain
because they feared economic collapse would be inevitable if Spain were pushed out.
There were also separatists who sought freedom from Spain and believed in “Cuba
Libre” or “Free Cuba.” Jose Martí, the most prominent leader of the Independence
movement,’ described “Cuba Libre” as more than just freedom from Spain, but rather,
freedom from all imperialist influence.22 He founded the official Cuban Revolutionary
Party in 1892, and battle broke out between Spain, some Cuban loyalists, and the
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Cuban Revolutionary Party in 1895.23 After much fighting, leaders of the revolution like
José Martí and Antonio Maceo were killed and finally in 1897 the Spanish queen offered
limited autonomy to Cuba. However, neither the loyalists nor the rebels accepted the
offer.24 With the fighting raging in Cuba, President McKinley of the United States looked
upon the Cuban situation with acquisitive eyes
The opinions of Cubans on U.S. intervention were largely mixed. Many of the
Spanish born inhabitants of Cuba, called peninsulares, favored U.S. intervention
because they preferred a government run by the United States than a government run
by Cubans. Cuban businessmen and property holders favored U.S. intervention
because they presumed their economy would improve if the U.S. took over. Those who
opposed U.S. intervention were mostly the poor farmers and impoverished rural
populations who thought their situation might worsen with a U.S. takeover.25 The United
States intervened in 1898 in spite of opposition from groups of Cuban rebels. U.S.
officials assumed that if the Cubans were successful in ousting Spain with American
help, that the Cubans would feel indebted to the United States.
In February of 1898 the USS Maine blew up in Havana harbor. The blast killed
260 crew members. Officials in the U.S. government accused Spain of bombing the
ship, which provided justification for militarily intervening in Cuba. Two months after the
sinking of the USS Maine, congress approved a proposal to militarily invade Cuba with
the intention of relinquishing Spanish rule in Cuba.
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The United States wasted no time and within 10 days of congressional approval
for Cuban intervention, the Teller Amendment was drafted. 26 The Teller Amendment
stated that the United States would not colonize Cuba but instead would temporarily
occupy the island until the Cubans were deemed able to self-govern.27 President
McKinley then declared a blockade in Cuba to prevent Spain from reaching the Island.
The Spanish declared war and U.S. congress answered back with their own declaration
of war on April 25, 1898. The physical war lasted through the summer of 1898 with
Spain and the United States drawing an armistice in August of 1898, followed by the
Treaty of Paris, which officially ended the Spanish-Cuban-American War. In all, the
United States acquired the territories of Puerto Rico, Guam, the Philippines and
temporary control over the island of Cuba. 28 As Lipman writes, “Spain handed its
colony over to the United States rather than grant Cuba independence. In this manner,
The United States erased more than thirty years of Cuban struggle and disingenuously
positioned itself as Cuba’s liberator.”29
Due to Cuba’s proximity to the United States and its apparent vulnerability, the
United States developed a sense of presumed ownership of the island. John Quincy
Adams once referred to Cuba as a “natural appendage to North America.” He furthered
that statement by arguing that once Cuba broke away from Spain, that it would naturally
gravitate toward the U.S.30 On top of the United States’ presumed ownership of Cuba,
Lars Schoultz points out that the U.S. imperialists considered the United States a
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paternal figure to Cuba; a teacher of sorts.31 Similarly, Michael Neagle notes how U.S.
journalists and artists often portrayed Cuba as a threatened female or damsel in
distress, with the United States coming swiftly to its rescue in times of need. 32
The Platt Amendment of 1901 was a document that reinforced the Teller
Amendment and provided new stipulations regarding U.S.-Cuban relations. The
document was drafted by Elihu Root of the United States and was presented to Cuba.
The first stipulation was the Cuba would be under occupation of the U.S. until it was
determined by the U.S. that Cuba was capable of self-governing. The Platt Amendment
further stated that Cuba would allow the United States to intervene in governmental
affairs at any time after the occupation, to protect the interests of independent Cuba. In
addition, the document stipulated that Cuba was required to sell or lease segments of
coastal land to the United States for use by the U.S. Navy. Lastly, the document
prohibited Cuba from entering into any treaties with other foreign
countries and also prohibited Cuba from allowing foreign nation besides the U.S.,
occupy any part of the island. Though the Platt Amendment was unpopular with most
Cubans, the U.S. officials insisted that the United States would not withdraw until Cuba
incorporated the Platt Amendment into its new constitution. With the declaration of
Tomás Estrada Palma as president, Cuba incorporated the Platt Amendment and
withdrew their troops.33
After American soldiers no longer occupied the island, the United States
government managed to keep its grasp on Cuba via a legal lease of forty-five square
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miles of land encompassing Guantánamo Bay, which was imposed in 1903.
Guantánamo was not the U.S. government’s first choice for the placement of a navy
base. They desperately wanted a base in Havana. But Cuban leaders fiercely resisted
ceding land in Havana, offering Guantánamo to pacify the United States. 34
U.S imperialists’ deep desire for Havana was partly due to their perception that
more people in Havana were of European descent and had fairer skin than people in
other regions of the island. Cubans in eastern provinces, including Guantánamo were
populated mostly by people of color. In the eyes of U.S. officials, this made
Guantánamo seem backward and wild in comparison to the more civilized Havana.
Some officers were consumed by the racial issue and “imagined the possibility of
possessing Guantánamo, without possessing the Guantanameros.”35 Despite their
desire for Havana, the U.S. settled for Guantánamo because its location within the
Caribbean was attractive even though they did not perceive the people as such.
The United States seized for itself a one-sided deal on the land surrounding
Guantánamo. It was leased to the United States by Cuba for a fee of two thousand
dollars, in gold coin, per year, roughly $52,000 today. The U.S. essentially grabbed
complete authority, jurisdiction, and control of the territory. Additionally, there was no
end date on the lease contract for the property. Thus, the eternal control extended by
the lease of Guantánamo amplified the United States’ presumed sense of ownership of
the island as a whole.
After Guantánamo was secured for the United States, American businesses
began to flourish in Cuba. Businessmen argued that since the U.S. continental frontier
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was closed, those looking for farming opportunities would find the most luck in Cuba. 36
To American business owners Cuba was the new land of opportunity. 37 One of the
main concerns for Americans looking to start businesses in Cuba was personal safety
and security of their investments.
Large land-owning companies like the Isle of Pines Company put those fears to
rest by reporting that “the United States government has absolutely pledged itself to see
that an orderly government is maintained and there is today in the Isle of Pines as
perfect security of life and property as in any part of the United States.”

38
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landholding companies also lobbied for the annexation of Cuba because Cuba
becoming a legal territory of the United States would secure all investments. The best
way to try and assure that annexation would take place was to encourage more
Americans to invest and settle in Cuba.39
Landholding companies also made it their mission to ensure investors that they
would not be poorly received by the Cuban people. They pledged that the island natives
were quite welcoming to the incoming Americans. The natives were also reported as
being non-hostile, intelligent, even gentlemanly—as opposed to the heathens and
savages depicted in the media.40 Their efforts were not in vain because American
interest certainly did take off. By 1910 roughly 10,000 Americans owned property in
Cuba.41
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There was an increase in the number of sugar plantations following the influx of
American business to the island. Most of the large companies such as the CubanAmerican Sugar Company, United Fruit Company and Guantanamo Sugar Company
were based in eastern Cuba.42 There were a few factors to explain this occurrence.
First, the east was heavily populated by impoverished people of color, who represented
a potential workforce. Additionally, there were migrant workers from Barbados, Jamaica,
and Haiti who settled in eastern Cuba which added to the workforce. 43 Thirdly, the
United States government maintained control of the port at Guantánamo. This made
eastern Cuba an ideal location for growing sugar because it would not have to be
transported a far distance before it could be exported.
Sugar, however, was not the only valuable export. The rum and cigar industry
also piqued the interest of American investors. Cuba’s soil and climate were ideal for
the growing of tobacco. Thus, the cigar industry in Cuba was booming until the 1930’s
when cigarettes surpassed cigars on the popularity scale. 44 Other business tycoons
sought to make profits in Cuba as well. Businesses like the United Fruit Company,
Goodyear Tires and Westinghouse all capitalized on opportunities to be had in Cuba.
Much of the economic boom in Cuba however was centralized in Havana, leaving the
rural populations still living in poverty. 45
There was great variation among the landowning Americans in Cuba.
Socioeconomic status dictated their Cuban experience. Typically, farmers and members
of the middle class made Cuba their permanent home, as they could not afford to
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migrate between Cuba and the United States for leisure or more desirable weather.
Those of higher socioeconomic status, typically employed workers to operate their
farms and businesses and enjoyed the luxury of returning to the United States
whenever they desired.46
Following the onset of Prohibition in the United States and the dawn of the
roaring twenties, “Cuba became the playground of the Caribbean.”

47

Cuba quickly

became America’s number one tourist destination. American investors began
purchasing land to construct hotels and casinos. One of the most notable sales of
Cuban land was to John McEntree Bowman. Bowman was the owner of the luxurious
Biltmore hotel chain in America. He was eager to build what became known as the
Sevilla-Biltmore, the most glamorous hotel in Cuba before the Hotel Nacional’s
construction in 1930. Bowman then went on to purchase other properties in Cuba such
as the Havana Jockey Club, the Gran Casino Nacional and racetracks. 48
American tourism in Cuba boomed throughout the 1920s. Americans arrived by
ship and by plane and made regular stops at taverns, casinos, and cabarets. Cuba was
described on a vacation promotional booklet published by the Winter in Cuba
Committee as a place where “Beauty reigns, relaxation prevails, and by courtesy of
license your personal liberty is unrestricted. Havana is one of the best-ordered capitals
in the world and is surely the liveliest.” 49 Cuba saw great economic gains in the
twenties. However, much of that changed after the crash of the American stock market
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in 1929, the onset of the great depression, and the end of Prohibition. 50 In an attempt to
combat the receding numbers of tourists, the renowned American architectural
company McKim, Mead and White constructed the Hotel Nacional in 1930. It was
finished with a blend of art deco, Moorish, and classical features. It quickly became the
country’s leading hotel. After it opened it was reserved exclusively for tourists. No
Cuban citizens other than government officials holding high office were permitted to stay
at the Hotel Nacional de Cuba.51
Politics in the 1920s were not as laid back as the social climate. In 1925 general
Gerardo Machado became president of Cuba. He was a nationalist and a supporter of
Cuban nationalist groups. The United States did not intervene in his regime because he
was a known friend to U.S. business. After three years in office, Machado essentially
reelected himself as president and assigned himself a six-year term, rather than a fouryear presidential term. His totalitarian governmental style, coupled with his reputation
for ruthlessness and cruelty, earned him the title of dictator.52
Cuban society and public opinion surrounding Machado was fragmented at first
but quickly took a downward turn. Both Machado and his law enforcement became
known for their brutal treatment of the Cuban people. Students and nationalists were
rallying. The business owners, many of which were American, demanded U.S.
intervention because they were facing government oppression from above and
nationalist resistance from below. Before the United States had the opportunity to
intervene, Machado resigned the presidency and fled the country to avoid total
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insurrection and probable death.53 One account of Machado’s escape describes how
the dictator’s plane was chased by gunman in cars. The attackers were unable to stop
the plane and Machado then resided in the United States for the remainder of his life.

54

In lieu of Machado’s absence, Cuba named Carlos Manuel de Cespedes as an interim
president, until elections could be held. Cespedes was a strategic choice for a leader,
because he was a former ambassador to Washington. However, the American-born
Cespedes did not last long in office. The Roosevelt administration partnered with
Cuba’s Army Chief of Staff, Fulgencio Batista, and quickly overthrew the Cespedes
regime.
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Batista served as a leader of the country from 1933 to 1940 when he was

officially elected president. He served as official president from 1940 to 1944.
The Good Neighbor Policy was a new foreign relations policy aimed at trying to
smooth the waters between the U.S and Latin America. President Franklin D. Roosevelt
was responsible for the execution of this new policy. His goal was to avoid armed
intervention of any kind in Latin America and Cuba especially. The Good Neighbor
Policy was in direct odds with the newly rescinded Platt Amendment. President
Roosevelt’s foreign policy was non-intrusive and promoted more self-determination for
Cuba than most other American policies had in the past. However, such a hands-off
relationship was easy to maintain, with President Batista in office in Cuba, as he was
effectively attached to Washington via puppet strings.
Batista served his elected presidency from 1940-1944. After the end of his term,
he held a powerful position in government as a provincial senator before running again
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for president in 1952. His chances of winning the election were slim and instead of
letting democracy run its course, he staged a governmental coup, nullified the
constitution and declared himself the new dictator of Cuba. Harry Truman and his
governmental officials moved quickly to recognize the new regime and supported
Batista’s efforts.56 The support of the Truman administration was linked to the fact that
Batista was a friend of American business. It was even rumored that the dictator was
installed with the help of Wall Street sugar investors. 57 As the Batista dictatorship
gained traction, oppositional forces began assembling. Peter Moruzzi sums up the state
of Cuba at the dawn of the 1950s as follows:
Cuba’s Achilles’ heel was an economy dominated by American Companies, and
a relatively small Cuban elite. This was particularly evident in the contrast
between prosperous Havana and the country’s desperately poor rural areas,
where the growing seeds of discontent would be harvested by Castro and his
revolution.58
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Chapter 2
The Rise of a New Regime

Fidel Castro graduated from law school in 1950 and began his crusade against
Batista just two years later. His revolution was both political and social. He mobilized
members of the rural and peasant classes and trained them in guerilla warfare tactics.
He preached and promoted self-determination, anti-imperialism, and nationalist
ideology. Castro’s goal to overthrow the Batista regime was clear, but the CIA was
uncertain of what would follow Batista’s overthrow.59 The CIA held that Castro’s main
objectives were to consolidate power and place the nation in his hands alone, distance
Cuba from U.S. influence, and equalize wealth and privilege of all Cubans.

60

Castro firmly believed in fighting to right the wrongs he felt Batista and the United
States had committed against the nation of Cuba. Therefore, on July 26, 1953 Fidel
Castro, and brother Raúl Castro led roughly 140 revolutionaries in an attack on the
Moncada Barracks in Santiago de Cuba. The Moncada Barracks, one of the largest
military garrisons in Cuba was an ideal location to wage an attack because it housed
many weapons which, Castro and his revolutionaries would gain for use in their
revolution, if the attack on the Moncada Barracks were successful.61
However, their attack failed and some of the revolutionaries were executed. Raúl
Castro was spared his life but was arrested. Fidel Castro managed to escape and took
refuge for several days in the Sierra Maestra mountains. After he was sure he would not
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be tortured by the Batista Police and was promised a fair trial, he surrendered and was
taken in to custody. In Fidel Castro’s defense hearing, he delivered a speech which
became the most famous speech of his life, a speech titled “History Will Absolve Me.” In
his trial on October 16, 1953 he proclaimed:
I warn you, I am just beginning! If there is in your hearts a vestige of love for your
country, love for humanity, love for justice, listen carefully. I know that I will be
silenced for many years; I know that the regime will try to suppress the truth by
all possible means; I know that there will be a conspiracy to bury me in oblivion.
But my voice will not be stifled – it will rise from my breast even when I feel most
alone, and my heart will give it all the fire that callous cowards deny it.
Castro was ruled guilty for conspiring against the Batista regime and was sentenced to
15 years in prison. However, in 1955 he and other political prisoners were granted
amnesty by President Fulgencio Batista and fled to Mexico. In Mexico Castro met
Ernesto “Che” Guevara, an Argentine revolutionary and together, Fidel Castro, Raúl
Castro, and Che Guevara mad plans for a revolution. In Guevara’s journal he wrote:
I talked all night with Fidel. And in the morning, I had become the doctor of his
new expedition. To tell the truth, after my experiences across Latin America I didn’t
need much more to enlist for a revolution against a tyrant. But I was particularly
impressed with Fidel. I shared his optimism. We needed to act, to struggle, to
materialise our beliefs. Stop whining and fight.62
Over the course of 1955, Castro and Guevara garnered the support of roughly
80 men to sail to Cuba with them the following year and begin the revolution. The group
of revolutionaries sailed from Mexico to eastern Cuba on an old leisure yacht named the
Granma. In early December of 1956 the Granma reached Cuba. Shortly after landing,
the revolutionaries were ambushed by Batista’s men. Over half of the revolutionaries
were killed in battle. The surviving members of the group took refuge in the Sierra
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Maestra mountain range where they regained their footings to stage the revolution.

63

As Castro and his revolutionary force in the Sierra Maestra mountains planned
their revolution, their ideals spread throughout the island. The ideals manifested into an
attack on the Presidential Palace on March 13, 1957 by a group of students aiming to
assassinate Fulgencio Batista. Batista however, managed to escape the assault
unscathed but there was much bloodshed on both the side of the Cuban army and that
of the rebels. The attack was unsuccessful, and Batista remained in power.64
After the assault of the Presidential Palace, Batista and his police became
seemingly paranoid about revolutionary attacks and became more aggressive and
brutal toward discovered conspirators.65 Revolutionary activity also became more
discreet. Castro and the revolutionaries moved carefully for several months. Some
Cubans even believed Castro had given up the fight all together.66 Skirmishes began to
once again break out in early 1958 and Batista had begun using U.S. trained and
military personnel, and U.S. weaponry, supplied by the CIA, to combat the
revolutionaries.67 Furthermore the U.S. Consul in Santiago de Cuba reported that
Batista’s police applied their “own system of justice which is swift, effective and without
appeal. As a daily occurrence bodies of young men are found hanged or lying along the
roadside with as many as 40 bullet holes.”68 The brutality of the Cuban government was
actually working against Batista because more Cuban people began to support the
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revolution as they witnessed how cruel the Batista regime appeared.69
Fidel Castro fulfilled his promise, that his voice would not be stifled, and by
November of 1958, the revolutionaries had gained traction. On January 1, 1959
President Batista fled Cuba after his six-year battle against the revolutionaries. The
revolutionary forces took control of the capital city of Havana that very same day. 70
It was reported by American Embassy staff in Havana, that the overthrow of the
Batista regime ignited a serious of chaotic riots and lootings across the capital city of
Havana.71 The revolutionaries broadcasted on the national radio station condemning
such behavior, but the destruction continued. People forced their way into prisons and
freed all prisoners. After the revolutionaries were able to force the Cuban army to
surrender to their will, they were able to use that military force to suppress the violence
in Havana.72
The United States kept a close eye on Cuban affairs in the days following
Batista’s overthrow. The American embassy called a meeting to discuss the recent
events. All the men present at the meeting argued that it would be in the best interest of
United States Businesses in Cuba, for the U.S. government to recognize the new
Cuban regime. On January 6, 1959 the American embassy advised President
Eisenhower and congress to recognize the new regime before Castro arrived in Havana
because though he was not instated as the official President of Cuba, he was
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“unquestionably the boss.”73 On January 7, 1959 John Foster Dulles, the U.S.
Secretary of State wrote to president Eisenhower and reported that the nation of Cuba
had returned to a peaceful state and there appeared to be no communist underpinnings
in the new provincial government. Dulles ended his memorandum by requesting that
President Eisenhower recognize the new regime.
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On January 9, 1959 Fidel Castro arrived in Havana and delivered a powerful
speech, debriefing the revolution’s success. Castro identified the four main desires of
the Cuban people as human rights, peace, liberty, and honest government. He
promised that the new provincial government were actively making efforts to implement
changes that would satisfy these desires. He further announced that he would not
accept any kind of chief or ministerial position. Instead, he argued that he was more
passionate about overseeing and reorganizing the Cuban military.75 In his speech he
stated:
I was asked what troops I would prefer to command, and I answered I would
prefer to command the people. Because the people are unconquerable and it
was the people who won this war, because we had no army, we had no fleet, we
had no tanks, we had no planes, we had no heavy guns, we had no military
academies or recruiting and training teams. We had neither divisions nor
regiments nor companies nor platoons, but we have the confidence of the
people, and with this alone we were able to win the battle for liberty. The people
have won this war. 76
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Castro was passionate about the will and vigor of the people and was proud of his
nation. Still, the New York times reported on January 4, 1959 that Castro had no desire
to run the country himself, and that his only aim was to “bring democracy to Cuba.” 77
Though neither of these statements by Castro stood the test of time, they temporarily
pacified U.S. foreign policy leaders’ fears of communism spreading throughout the
western hemisphere, and a new radical revolutionary regime. However, the relatively
tranquil relationship between Castro and the United States government would be short
lived. Ten days later Castro publicly condemned U.S. involvement of any kind in Cuban
affairs, and by February 13, 1959 Fidel Castro was the new Prime Minister of Cuba. 78
American Embassy staff first hinted at the threat of communism in Cuba in April
of 1959. The dispatch began with a summary based on embassy staff observances. It
stated:
Under the benevolent tolerance of Fidel Castro and sheltered by his unfriendly
attitude toward the United States and his drastic program of social and economic
reform, Communism is growing in Cuba and successfully infiltrating various
sectors of public life. The Communist Party (PSP) is functioning openly, and a
number of publications and radio-TV programs are carrying its message. Main
centers of Communist strength are in the Revolutionary Army and the labor
unions.79
The report continued by stating that though Castro himself had not identified as a
communist, he was still no friend to the United States. The report summary mentioned
that communists had infiltrated various sectors of Cuban life and was allegedly
spreading. However, the report also noted there some groups within Cuba like the
Catholic Church who opposed it and encouraged resistance to it. University statistics as

“Castro Wins: New Regime for Cuba,” The New York Times, (New York, NY) January 4, 1959.
Franklin, Cuba and the U.S. Empire, 19.
79
U.S. Department of State, Dispatch from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State,
Foreign Relations of the United States, Cuba, Volume VI, Document 278, Havana, April 14, 1959.
77
78

35

of April 14, 1959 remained unclear. It was documented that students had given left
leaning speeches, but the popularity of the speeches remained ambiguous. The
embassy argued that communist ideology was gaining momentum in Cuba for a few
reasons. The first of which was that the communists cooperated with the revolutionary
movement, thus winning their right to exist as a political group in Castro’s new honest
government. The second factor in communist success was that though Castro had not
openly declared himself a communist, many communist ideals and strategies paralleled
those of Castro. Lastly, the communists were ready to fill the labor voids created by the
overthrow of the Batista regime and the political exiles.80
U.S. officials wanted to keep the communism contained and hinder the growth of
the movement. The embassy drafted an action plan to combat the communist threat.
They had a sixteen-step plan, with various tactics such as be friendly with the Cuban
government, but be firm about negative feelings toward communism, try to keep Castro
isolated from the communists, publish and shame discovered communists in the local
Cuban media, and assist anti-communist Cubans in applying for U.S. visas. 81 However,
analysists for the State Department argued that the surest way to stop Cuba from
turning into a communist regime, was to ensure that the relationship between the United
States and Fidel Castro was strong and positive. This is a key difference between the
State Department’s approach to dealing with Castro and the CIA’s approach. The State
Department aimed to keep a good relationship with Cuba, whereas the CIA’s mistrust of
Castro may have clouded their ability to focus on a positive relationship with the nation
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as a whole. The State Department quickly began planning a trip for Fidel Castro to visit
the United States.
For Washington, Castro’s visit was an opportunity for the United States to
develop a positive relationship with Castro that could potentially foster grand economic
opportunities for the United States and spare them future conflict. For Castro, the visit
offered him a chance to discuss with the United States government how he wanted
Cuba to be situated in U.S. foreign policy. Castro could articulate to U.S. officials that he
had no interest in the United States exerting any kind of influence over the island of
Cuba. However, Washington was prepared with scripted lines to pitch to Castro during
the meeting, to try and persuade him to work with the United States in order to further
U.S. interests.
There were three approaches that the State Department proposed as acceptable
suggestions on how to treat Castro during his visit to Washington. The first approach
was to explain to Castro that the United States has always supported the development
of democracy in Cuba, and to remind Castro that this was the goal when the United
States aided the Cubans in their first revolution against Spain. Furthermore, they
wanted to convince Castro that the only reason his revolutionaries supported his
overthrow of Batista was because they hoped that the new regime would be a
representative democracy.82 The writers of the memorandum intended that their
suggestions to Castro would accomplish two goals. First, identifying that the United
States was a friend to Cuba and wanted to see a democracy flourish there, would
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position the United States in a positive light historically as Cuba’s rescuers and
confidante. Second, they hoped it would force Castro to question the motives of his
fellow revolutionaries. Did they overthrow Batista because they were opposed to corrupt
government as Castro argued, or did they participate because they themselves desired
democratic representation in their nation?
In the second approach on dealing with Castro, the State Department framed
their narrative to argue that the Cuban revolution was neither motivated by antiAmerican ideology, nor by communist theory. Rather, it was supported by Cuban people
who had been traditionally friendly toward the United States and thus, would never
support a movement had it been laced with communist or anti-American sentiments.83
This approach benefits the United States because it uses the people as a medium
through which to control Castro. If Castro had the benefit of the people and their
interests in mind, as he claimed, then he would be more receptive to the desires of
those people—even if said desires were the manifestations of the U.S. government.
The third approach drafted by the State Department was to try to partner with
Castro so that the United States could pursue interests that were best for both nations
and respect each other’s devotion to freedom. 84 This approach was ideal for the State
Department because it would allow for access to Cuban resources by American
businesses. The State Department would quite easily be able to use the mutual
interests’ clause to their advantage, and likely would. The idea of such a “partnership”
harked back to an earlier relationship between the United States and Cuba, in which the
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U.S. assumed it knew what was best for Cuba and denied Cuba any self-determination.
More than anything though, the central theme of each of the three of these State
Department approaches was that United States wanted to step over Castro and appeal
directly to the Cuban people.85 This was the plan because U.S officials realized along
with Castro, that the people had won the revolution and there was power in the masses.
Therefore, if the United States government could win the hearts and minds of the Cuban
people, and appeal to their desires, they could secure a stake in the new revolutionary
regime.
The CIA was also preparing their own suggestions on how to deal with Castro
during his visit. Due to the stark contrast of approach and tone in the CIA’s document, it
is unlikely that the State Department and the CIA were in dialogue with one another on
this topic. The CIA briefed its members on Castro’s history, his ideology, and what they
thought they could expect from him in the months to come. The CIA half-heartedly
commended Castro for his dedication to the revolution and argued that he was able to
achieve success because of his ability to produce and distribute effective propaganda,
his systematic approach to radicalizing his government, his attempts to educate the
young and rural peoples, and his forced emigration of his enemies.
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Thus, the CIA did

not list qualities like effective leadership, strategic military plans, or a population that
trusted him to describe why he was victorious in his revolution. This is likely because
the CIA either did not believe he had those qualities or believed he had them but was
threatened by his victory and did not want to bolster Castro’s image any further.
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The CIA then produced a confidential report prior to Castro’s visit to Washington.
The report outlined things to keep in mind in case one was to cross paths with Castro
during his visit. The report proposed no approach to dealing with Castro, but rather line
items or reminders on why one should not trust Castro.
The report from April 13, 1959 listed several alleged facts about Castro aimed to
portray him in a bad light. The CIA anticipated that Castro would intend to put his best
foot forward in Washington because he needed financial aid from the U.S. government
in order to get his new regime off the ground. Without the aid, the CIA assumed that the
new regime would collapse within a matter of months. In order to create the image that
Castro and his revolutionaries were upstanding, civilized diplomats, the CIA predicted
that Castro would bring Cuban businessmen and diplomats along to Washington as
advisors, rather that fellow revolutionaries such as his brother Raul or friend and
confidante Che Guevara. The CIA argued that bringing individuals like Raul and Che
would too accurately represent the “bloodthirsty’ atmosphere of the revolution, and
Castro knew that would work against him in dealing with the United States. 87
The CIA also hinted in their report that communism, and communist ideals were
circulating in Cuba. It pointed out that Castro’s popularity was steadily declining among
the upper and middle class, but that he was still a hero to the peasant class. Castro
allegedly vowed to create a single middle class by elevating the poor at the expense of
the upper classes. Finally, the CIA argued that Castro allowed the known communists to
infiltrate the military, labor force, cultural centers, and educational institutions.88
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Therefore, the CIA wanted its members to be aware that though Castro was not a
declared communist, that he did not necessarily oppose communism either.
In the report, Allen Dulles suggested that Castro would go over the head of the
U.S. State department in order to appeal to the American people.89 It is peculiar that
Dulles would anticipate this course of action for Castro, because it was nearly exactly
the same plan that the State Department intended to use on Castro. However,
threatening that Castro would attempt to win over the American people, could have
been simply Dulles’ attempt to justify circulating anti-Castro and anti-Cuban
propaganda.
The one thing that the CIA wanted the rest of the government to know prior to
Castro’s arrival was that Castro was no friend to the United States. Dulles stated that
Castro “has shown considerable unfriendliness toward the U.S. government. By halftruths, exaggerations and outright lies, he has endeavored to whip up anti-Americanism
in Cuba. Whether this is a result of deep personal prejudice or demagoguery to attract
masses, has got to be proved.”90
Castro’s visit to Washington D.C. from April 15, 1959 to April 26, 1959 was
declared neither positive nor negative. He met with U.S. government officials during his
stay and discussed a number of different issues. A few of which were his position on
communism, his policies moving forward on American businesses in Cuba, and new
democratic laws to be established in Cuba.
Overall the State Department claimed that after Castro’s visit, that the man was
still an enigma. Castro indicated that he intended to remain in the western camp,
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meaning that his nation would not succumb to communism in the foreseeable future. He
then explained some of his new ideas for land reform. These ideas worried the State
department as they were somewhat rooted in leftist ideals due to their foundational
principal: redistribution of property. These new ideals made more than just the State
Department uncomfortable. Businessmen and those owning property in Cuba were off
put because it appeared that U.S. business in Cuba could be ousted if Castro’s new
land reform policies were set in place.
The State Department reported that Castro insisted his new regime was
democratic. The masses positively reacted to his speeches, new legislation, and
approved overall of his leadership. The State Department, however commented in their
summary of the Castro meeting, that Castro may have confused the appreciable roar of
audiences with the concept of representative democracy. They further advised that the
government of the United States not underestimate Castro, because, as a result of his
visit, he gained insight on the inner-workings of American government. The State
Department also feared that Castro might radicalize his revolution further because
Castro was more concerned with the ends than the means.
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During his eleven-day stay in the United States, Castro made several public
appearances in addition to his discussions with officials like Vice President Nixon in
Washington. Castro spoke at Princeton and Harvard and Columbia. He also delivered a
two-hour speech in Central Park. In his speeches and presentations, he repeated one
message numerous times. That message was that the Cuban revolution was “not for
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export.” He preached that he nor his countrymen would assist in other Latin American
revolutions, but he would encourage such countries, who needed a revolution, to let
Cuba be their example. 92 This had been one of the greatest fears of the CIA, that
Castro would encourage other Latin American Regimes to cast out imperialists and oust
figurehead or “puppet” style governments. .93 The CIA especially feared this in nations
already known to have communist infiltration. Therefore, Castro neither reinforced those
fears, nor pacified them in his speeches in the States. The CIA would simply have to
watch and wait.
Castro departed for Cuba on April 26, 1959. When he arrived home to his island
nation, he began planning his new Agrarian reform, which would become the first of
many hot button issues between the United States and their neighbor to the south.
The basis of Castro’s Agrarian Reform was to take land from great landowners
and redistribute that land to Cubans who owned little to no land. Immediately, the
capitalists in charge of the U.S. government were unsettled by phrase “redistribution of
wealth.” At first however, the American government was much more worried about what
this new Agrarian Reform would mean for American companies who owned land in
Cuba.
Castro claimed that there was a solution for those who would be stripped of a
portion of their land. He promised that companies and individuals whose land was
redistributed, would be monetarily compensated for their lost land. Castro reminded his
nation that
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We must declare, as we always have under such circumstances, that we make
laws only for the benefit of the nation, even if these laws must sometimes
damage certain interests. We do not make laws by – hate, as we do not hate
anybody. We understand perfectly that we are a consequence of the past, we
have the obligation to correct past mistakes.94

Therefore, Castro knew that this reform would be unpopular among some of his
own countrymen but claimed that he was doing right by his country in pushing forward.
However, landowners and businessmen did not see it that way. The new reform would
be devastating to U.S. business in Cuba.
The market that would be especially damaged by Castro’s new regime was the
sugar market. U.S. economists argued that not only would U.S. revenue from the sugar
industry plummet, so would the production of sugar in Cuba if Castro followed through
on the reforms. By redistributing big business, sugar producing land to the unskilled
peasantry, sugar production will naturally decline. This is widely due to that fact that
even if the unskilled peasantry had the means and ability to plant, grow, and harvest
sugar cane, there would still be a lull in production as the large companies harvested
the last of their sugar, and the peasants learned the skills necessary to begin a new
cycle. The productivity decrease however, would not happen right away because sugar
takes roughly eighteen months to fully ripen. U.S. officials were unsuccessful in their
attempts to persuade Castro to reconsider his reform, because Castro later declared
that expropriations of U.S. land would begin within a year’s time.

95

The Agrarian

Reform Law officially went into effect on June 3, 1959. The U.S was dissatisfied with
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the compensation rate on lands to be appropriated from U.S. business owners, and they
protest the reform. However, their protests were ignored96
Threatened by the reform, the U.S. set out over the summer and early fall of
1959 to devise a plan to combat it. It was during this time in which Cuba lowered its
national rates for electricity. This directly affected U.S. profits, as the Cuban Electric
company was an American owned corporation. Infuriated by the loss of profits, coupled
with the agrarian reform, the United States military went on to drop bombs on Cuban
sugar plantations in October of 1959, just before a completed draft of the new policy
towards Cuba was released to government officials.97 In the new policy towards Cuba,
the State Department claimed that Castro’s new legislation and programs were not
consistent with what the U.S. considered fair economic relations between the U.S. and
Cuba. The U.S. was appalled by Castro’s appropriations of U.S. land, and criticized his
left leaning ideologies.
The State Department also divulged to the CIA, the U.S Information Agency,
the U.S Embassy in Cuba and the Office of International and National Security Affairs,
that Castro allowed communists to penetrate many facets of society, including high
offices of government. However, the State department also knew that Castro had won
over the hearts and minds of most of his people, and they had a deep adoration for him.
Therefore, U.S. officials needed to tread carefully when entertaining the possibility of
forcing Castro to alter his policies, as doing so could have severe consequences and
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more anti-American sentiments. The U.S. needed an action plan to deal with what they
considered to be an unstable and potentially hostile regime. 98
A plan was devised by the State department to formalize a new policy towards
Cuba to manage relations during this delicate time. The policy insisted that by the end
of 1960, Cuba must meet the basic requirements in the OCB Regional Operations Plan
for Latin America, which is the document governing U.S. policy goals toward Latin
American nations. Second, the United States should assure Cuba that the chances of
U.S. intervention were slim to none, unless the U.S. needed to defend its interests or
principles. Third, the U.S should avoid at all costs, encouraging the consolidation of the
Castro regime. Fourth, any policies designed to encourage opposition to Castro, and
would likely be accepted by the Cuban people should be pursued. Finally, any materials
promoting representative democracy in Latin America should also be pursued to the
fullest extent possible. 99 Therefore, the State Department’s new policy on dealing with
Cuba was to essentially cut the legs out from under Castro by turning his people against
him and undermining his authority. Furthermore, spreading democratic ideals
throughout Latin America was an attempt to contain the revolutionary ideals that made
the new Cuban regime possible. These democratic ideals were also meant to contain
the threat of communism that the U.S. perceived to be aggressively brewing in Cuba.
Castro however, had an answer for the United States. In October of 1959
Castro had not declared allegiance to the socialist or communist party. Instead he
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suggested in his speech at the loyalty rally, that the United States government was
offended by the new revolutionary reforms because they interfered with U.S. Interests.
He goes on to discuss how any move Cuba could make would interfere with foreign
interests, whether it be producing new crops, instating revenue boosting trade tariffs,
increasing their exports, or installing a mine, other nations would be vexed by it because
such a move by Cuba could cut in on their profits. In his speech he calls out the United
States specifically in his speech and stated the following:
I ask: has the Revolutionary Government done anything that the people do not
approve? What has the Revolutionary Government done except defend the
interests of the people? What have we done except sacrifice ourselves for our
country? In four centuries of Cuban history never has there been such an
altruistic movement. . . Because our Revolutionary laws have an adverse effect
on privileged classes inside Cuba and outside Cuba, they attack us and attack us
and call us Communists. They accuse us, trying to find some pretext to justify
aggression against our country. 100
Castro identified the United States officials as “wretched conspirators”, thus arguing that
the presence of communism and communist ideals in Cuba were a scapegoat for the
United States government to act aggressively towards Cuba. When the underlying
reason for the aggression was the frustration the United States felt due to having lost
control over the resources of a nation that once turned colossal profits for them.
The theory of U.S. leaders having used communism as a scapegoat to invade
Cuba is one that is relatively unique to Castro. Even if perhaps some Americans had
considered the possibility that U.S. officials were more afraid of losing profits than they
were of communism as an ideology, no one would voice that opinion. During the fifties
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and sixties in America, the House of Un-American Activities Committee of “HUAC” as it
was commonly called, was constantly searching for American citizens who had
communist ideologies or were in some way tied to the communist party. If Americans
were found to have communist affiliations, it oftentimes destroyed their careers and their
reputations. Therefore, it is unlikely that any American would have voiced this opinion or
agree with Castro on any matter.
Castro’s address to the people continued and in it, he suggested that United
States wanted nothing more than to bring down the new revolutionary regime. He
stated, “They want to destroy the revolution with their terrorism and by means of
economic strangulation. But the revolution is not just mine; the revolution belongs to the
people and we are doing nothing but carry out the will of the people.”101 He pointed to
economic strangulation as the strategy for the U.S. government’s plan to weaken Cuba.
He was correct, however the “economic strangulation” Cuba had experienced up to that
point was more of a gentle stifling, when compared to what was to come. Cuba had only
seen the tip of the iceberg in regard to how far the United States would go to cripple the
Cuban economy.
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Chapter 3
1960: Cutthroat Economics vs Military Force

Fidel Castro and his fellow revolutionary leaders wasted no time in enacting the
terms of the agrarian reform. In January of 1960 Cuba expropriated over 70,000 acres
of the land from the United States. None of which was accompanied by a monetary
compensation. U.S. companies who owned property in Cuba were outraged by the
expropriations. U.S. Congress protested the seizure of land without compensation. Like
their earlier attempts to stifle the agrarian reform, this new objection was similarly
rejected by the Cuban government. As a result of Cuba’s refusal to adjust the terms of
the agrarian reform, U.S. officials began entertaining the idea of cutting the sugar quota.
The sugar quota was a vitally important aspect in Cuban trade. Cuba held a
special position with the United States in regard to trade. Cuba paid less duties than all
other countries and had a guaranteed sugar quota that the United States would
purchase from them each year.102 Sugar and sugar products comprised 79 percent of
Cuban exports to the United States in 1960. These exports were a significant annual
source of revenue for Cuba; 342 million dollars to be exact.103 If the sugar quota was
cut, it would mean that the United States would no longer receive imported sugar from
Cuba in the huge quantities it had in the past. Additionally, a cut in the sugar quota
would likely devastate the Cuban economy because Cuba would have a copious supply
of sugar, but no demand for it. U.S. officials in many government agencies believed that
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cutting the sugar quota would be an effective tool in forcing Cuba to submit to their will.
However, that was a decision the President was not prepared to make just yet.
U.S. executive officials instituted immediate retaliation against Cuba for
declining to amend the agrarian reform. More bombs were dropped on Cuban sugar
plantations buy the United States government. This time the bombs were not dropped in
the rural country side, but rather on sugar plantations located in Havana province, close
to the Cuba’s capital city. It was the goal of U.S. foreign policy leaders to incite fear
among the Cuban people, in hopes that the people of Cuba would demand that Castro
work with the United States, instead of against them.
In February, Castro responded to the protest by stating he was willing to create
a council that could act as a mediator between the United States and Cuba, with the
goal being to discuss all of the differences between the two nations. His proposal was
contingent upon a promise that the United States would halt attacks and other
measures of hostility while the discussions took place. The offer was declined by the
President because Washington received a tip that Castro agreed to sell twenty percent
of Cuba’s sugar supply to the Soviet Union for the next five consecutive years. 104
In February of 1960 the CIA began to perceive the Soviet Union’s attitude
towards Cuba was shifting from cautionary to supportive. This was affirmed with the
Soviet Union’s allocation of $100,000,000 worth of economic aid credit. 105 The CIA
reported that in the official communication records between Cuba and the Soviet Union
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there was no mention of a promise to supply Cuba with arms, but the CIA expected an
arms deal would certainly manifest in the future.
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The trade and economic aid agreements between the Soviet Union and Cuba
created even more tension than had already existed between the Cuba and the United
States. Cuba had not declared itself communist as of the spring of 1960, but the
growing relationship between Cuba and the Soviet Union was one that could not bet
ignored by the United States. The CIA drafted a briefing for the National Security
Council, in which the CIA declared that the United States and Cuba could never have a
friendly relationship if Fidel Castro remained in control. They claimed that Castro was
influencing the media to whip up anti-American propaganda and the CIA feared for the
lives of U.S. embassy employees stationed in Havana. The tensions were so high that
they went so far as to devise an evacuation plan for embassy staff.
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The briefing for the National Security Council also warned of Fidel Castro and
Che Guevara’s opposition to foreign private investments in Cuba. The CIA claimed that
the Cuban officials particularly condemned foreign industry. However, setting economic
threats aside, the CIA further worried and anticipated that Castro would nationalize the
land surrounding Guantánamo.108 It was believed that he was willing and able to
remove American influence from Guantánamo because he so effortlessly removed
American businesses from Cuba without compensation. The U.S. government seemed
to be under the impression that Castro could and would do whatever he wanted and
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wondered if he actually represented the desires of the Cuban people or if he was “just
plain crazy.”109
Cuba however, understood that they needed to be careful about making any
new decisions that negatively affected U.S. interests until they had assurance that they
could be backed economically, industrially and militarily by another super power. The
Soviet Union had already agreed to purchase twenty percent of Cuba’s sugar crop for
the year to come, but Castro wanted an opportunity to see what benefits, other than
direct profit, were to gain by initiating trade with the Soviet Union. Therefore, Cuba
entered into a trade agreement with Poland. Poland, then part of the Soviet Bloc,
offered Cuba technical aid, scientific assistance, and credit to purchase industrial
machines and equipment. Cuba also started negotiating with Hungary, another member
of the Soviet Bloc, to ensure opportunities to purchase machinery in the future. Castro
also set in motion, a trade agreement for Russian crude oil. If fueling stations were set
up in Cuba with Russian oil, Cuba would then become a vital base for naval trade, due
to its convenient location in the central Caribbean. Therefore, an oil agreement
benefitted both Cuba and the Soviet Union.
In addition to the trade agreements, Castro also had the intention of sending
Cubans “from all walks of life” accompanied by several government officials, to visit the
Soviet Union in April of 1960. The goal of the trip for the Cuban civilians was to witness
a different way of life than their own. The government officials, however, had a different
agenda. They were there to investigate the extent of the Soviet Union’s willingness to
militarily support Cuba. The CIA suspected that Castro desperately wanted to figure out
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how far the Soviet Union would go to protect Cuba, in case of a U.S. intervention.

110

The number of trade agreements between Cuba and the Soviet Union signaled to the
CIA that Cuba itself was on the verge of going red.
The U.S. State department, on the other hand, was not so quick to chalk up the
entire regime as communist. The State Department preferred to analyze the situation in
Cuba objectively by identifying and separating current threats from future threats. They
pointed out and did not deny that communist groups were allowed to openly exist in
Cuba and had indeed infiltrated multiple facets of society. However, they refused to
believe that the Communist forces had swayed Castro further to the left.111 The State
Department agreed with the CIA, by asserting that Castro would do anything he wanted
without direction from foreign governments but were not convinced that he was a
communist.
Additionally, the State Department added that the communists were certainly
not strong enough to make a bid for power or the office of the prime minister. The
suggested that the communists would avoid challenging Fidel for power and instead
would center their efforts on covert infiltration in the government. The State Department
also stated that Cuba in 1960 was not dominated by communists and they suggested
that it would not be dominated by communists in the foreseeable future. 112 However,
they were leery that the more aggravated Fidel Castro became with the United States,
the stronger his relationship with the Soviet Bloc would become. The State Department
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also made the connection that the Soviet Bloc would likely not hesitate to use Cuba as a
pawn in order to initiate a military confrontation with the United States.
The CIA’s opinion and the State Department’s opinion on communism was
different because the CIA was convinced that Cuba’s relationship with the Soviet Union
was a representation of Cuban ideology. The CIA’s logic was as follows: Cuba has
trade agreements with the Soviet Union, therefore Cuba is communist. The State
Department on the other hand would argue that it was feasible for the Cuban
government to have democratic ideals and also have trade agreements with communist
nations. The State Department acknowledged that there was indeed communist
infiltration in Cuban society, but that it was not necessarily connected to the newfound
friendships with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the State Department was thinking more
broadly about Cuba and its unique position in global politics and economics, and thus
arrived at the conclusion that Cuba’s relationship with the Soviet Union was more
threatening than communist groups within Cuba, because that relationship with the
Soviet Union could yield military confrontations between the U.S. and the USSR.
In April of 1960 the State Department sent Richard G. Cushing from the office
of public affairs to Cuba to analyze anti-Castro groups, public opinion and the economy.
He reported that in his opinion, the new Castro regime was a dictatorship and argued
that the only difference between Castro’s Cuba and Batista’s Cuba is that it was left
leaning rather than right leaning. Cushing observed that there was no identifiable,
organized, opposition to Castro and that the communists were making progress and
had successfully infiltrated society. As for the economy, it was on the decline, and it
would only worsen if the United States cut the sugar quota. Many Cubans were worried
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about what would happen if the U.S. did cut the sugar quota and were in favor of
keeping relations with the United States good enough to still maintain trade
agreements.113
Cushing also reported that public opinion for Castro had dwindled down from
95% when he first became prime minister, down to roughly 50% by April of 1960. Most
of the people who disapproved of Castro were in the middle to upper classes, but
Cushing reported that Castro was also losing popularity amongst teachers as more
Marxist materials became mandated in national curriculum.
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From this report the

State Department pieced together a morose picture of Cuban life and Cuba’s future.
Only twelve days after Cushing’s report to the State Department came one of
the first documented discussions of overthrowing the Castro regime. Edward E Rice, a
member of the State Department’s policy planning staff stated on April 13, 1960 “I hope
and assume we are readying, for possible use, means for overthrowing the Castro
regime; one should always have two strings to one’s bow.”115 By this Rice meant that
the state department should start thinking about multiple action plans that could be
taken to overthrow Fidel Castro. Rice and other U.S. government officials were also
interested in overthrowing the neighboring regime of Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican
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Republic, but the Dominican was not U.S. foreign policy leaders’ first priority. Thus, Rice
suggested that the State Department should consider a plan to overthrowing both
regimes simultaneously because Trujillo was such a hated dictator, that the U.S. may
have been able to capitalize on the distaste for Trujillo and use the support for
overthrowing the Dominican Republic to help overthrow Cuba as well.116
The very next day, following Rice’s proposal, a security council meeting was
held in Washington to discuss potential options for removing Castro. Instead of the
State Department committing to the overthrow of an entire regime, it was likely more
feasible to first try and get rid of one man. Three possible outcomes to the Cuban
situation were identified at the meeting and they were “(1) the assassination of Castro,
which would make him a martyr, (2) Castro’s suicide, which is a possibility in the event
of failure and (3) a continuation of the present trend, resulting ultimately in a socialist
dictatorship and a Batista-type terror in Cuba”.117 Therefore Castro’s suicide would have
ultimately been the most ideal situation for members of the State Department and other
governmental agencies who desired Castro’s overthrow. However, there was no way to
ensure his suicide, and the State Department did not want to sit idly by as Cuba
became socialist and its people suppressed. Thus, the option to assassinate Castro
was the best choice for them, but official assassination plans had not yet been
designed. Before they drafted official assassination plans, they first wanted to see how
the rumored economic strangulation tactics against Cuba materialized.
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The State Department officially documented that they were entering into “stage
3” in their dealings with Cuba on May 11, 1960. Assistant secretary of State Roy R.
Rubottom identified three strategic stages that the U.S. government steered through
since the start of the Cuban Revolution. The first stage was consisted of acknowledging
the Castro regime and welcoming Castro to the United States on a visit. The goal of the
first stage was to neutralize any hostilities and try to persuade Castro to discover and
cultivate a more westernized ideology. Castro did not cooperate as well as U.S. officials
would have hoped, so the State Department initiated stage two of their dealings with
Cuba.
Stage two was titled the “policy of restraint” and it was designed to be more of
an observatory stage in which the State Department was neither hostile nor
exceptionally friendly to their southern neighbors. The goal in taking this quiet position
was to allow Castro to destroy U.S.—Cuban relations on his own, with no U.S.
retaliation. This would have ideally helped garner the support of the Cuban people, by
leading them to believe that the United States was wronged by Castro, the U.S was
undeserving of that treatment, and furthermore was merciful enough to not enact
counter attacks against Cuba. The State Department had hoped that their policy of
restraint would have distorted the Cubans’ view of their leader enough to jump ship and
side with the United States.
By May of 1960 stages one and two had come and gone, and Rubottom
suggested it was time to begin the third stage which requires that
The United States use judiciously selected economic pressures at those points
where Castro’s domestic and international policies have weakened Cuba’s
economic structure in order to engender more public discomfort and discontent
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and thereby to expose to the Cuban masses Castro’s responsibility for
mishandling their affairs 118
Rubottom further identified the area that the United States must attack first:
foreign exchange. He suggested sabotaging Cuba’s foreign trade because Cuba relied
so heavily on imports, and their major export was sugar. The State Department first
targeted the sugar quota because the United States was Cuba’s best customer in
regard to sugar. It would take little effort on the part of U.S. government officials to cut
the sugar quota and cripple the Cuban economy. That is what the situation was coming
to in April of 1960.
The CIA on the other hand, had implemented plans of their own. While the
State Department was experimenting with cut throat economics, the CIA began drafting
plans for an invasion of Cuba. In late March of 1960, Eisenhower sent a secret letter to
Allen Dulles, authorizing the CIA to begin planning for an invasion of Cuba.

119

The

plans that the CIA began to draw up set the invasion date for the spring of 1961. This
invasion would come to be known as the Bay of Pigs Invasion. In the planning stages of
the invasion, one thing was certain, air operations and air planes would play a key role
in the attack. 120
The overall goal of the invasion was to “bring about the replacement of the
Castro regime with one more devoted to the true interests of the Cuban people and
more acceptable to the U. S. in such a manner as to avoid any appearance of U. S.
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intervention.” 121 The CIA aimed to orchestrate a scheme to oust Fidel Castro and his
fellow revolutionaries and replace their regime with a new one which would be better for
Cubans and friendlier to America. The goal was for the CIA to control all actions both
inside and outside of Cuba and do so undetected by Castro and his officials.
In order to realize these goals, the CIA developed a four-step program to
outline the major courses of action for the invasion. The first thing that the CIA identified
as a necessary accessory to the plan were a group of anti-Castro Cubans who could
unify, organize, and responsibly carry out orders from the CIA in order to carry out an
overthrow the Castro regime. The CIA had been in contact with three opposition groups
within Cuba and aimed to consolidate their efforts to form a military junta, united under
the slogan “Restore the Revolution.”122 This slogan was meant to insinuate that the
Castro Regime had veered off from the original values of the revolution and now was a
dangerous detriment to society. The slogan was also effective in communicating the
message that what the United States was orchestrating was a positive movement for
Cuba. Therefore, it helped frame the junta in a positive way, making it an appealing, or
at the very least competitive political alternative to Castro’s regime.
The next step in the program involved creating an avenue for mass
communication of the opposition’s ideals and for the distribution of anti-Castro
propaganda. The CIA decided that the best way deliver the information was through
long and short-wave radio broadcasts. The location from which the broadcasts were to
be released from was a broadcasting facility on Swan Island off the coast of Honduras.
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The broadcasts were designed to be accompanied by written material and pamphlets
dispersed secretively throughout the nation. 123
The CIA’s third step in the action plan was to appoint a covert intelligence force
to serve as an intermediary between the United States and the opposition. The desired
outcome of the intelligence intermediary was to provide constructive and reliable intel on
the status of the Castro regime and the progress of the opposition force. The
intermediary was also responsible for orchestrating the distribution of illegal, proopposition propaganda within the nation of Cuba. Finally, such an intelligence force
would also recruit valuable individuals to join the opposition.
The last step in the process involved organizing a paramilitary training base for
cadres to be prepped for deployment into Cuba. The goal of this unofficial, semimilitarized force would ultimately be to lead an insurrection in Cuba that would result in
the overthrow of the Castro regime. The CIA began searching for locations outside the
United States and Cuba which would be safe and undetectable sites for cadre training
facilities. 124 Thus, the CIA had bypassed economic strangulation tactics and moved
more in the direction of military force.
In the spring of 1960, the State Department and the CIA’s approaches to
handling Cuba differed greatly. The State Department initiated cut throat economics,
starting with a conversation of terminating the sugar quota, whereas the CIA designed a
plan to combat the Cuban situation with military force. It would seem that the State
Department in 1960 had not yet abandoned diplomacy and finesse as options for
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settling the differences between two nations. The CIA on the other hand adopted
Theodore Roosevelt’s famous proverb: “Speak softly and carry a big stick.” 125
Though the State Department and CIA’s tactics were different, the two
agencies still were aware of each other’s plans and often made decisions together. By
June of 1960 both the State Department and the CIA believed that it would be nearly
impossible to have a friendly relationship with Cuba in the foreseeable future. They
further both agreed that the situation in Cuba had to change and removing Castro from
office was the best thing for the future of the relationship between the U.S. and Cuba.
The State Department, however, was not as aggressive as the CIA, and had
not drafted any assassination plans or plans to overthrow the regime as of June 1960.
Whereas the CIA had set plans in motion to overthrow the Castro regime. The State
Departments opted for a more relaxed approach and argued that the United States
government had to this point, minimally cooperated with the Cuban government, while
offering enough cooperation to maintain the illusion to both American citizens and
Cuban citizens, that trade relations were healthy. They also argued that they had made
it a point to not silence Castro’s anti-U.S. sentiments, lending him the opportunity to
show his true colors to the rest of the world. 126 Therefore, the State Department aimed
to make it appear as though Castro alone had sabotaged the relationship between the
United States and Cuba, and the U.S. would come out looking like the victim.
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It was in June of 1960 that the State Department became reasonably sure that
Castro had indeed succumbed to the communists and was himself an undeclared
communist. This observation helped to sway congress to set in motion an amendment
of the sugar act, which included a clause on authorizing the president to cut the sugar
quota for the remainder of 1960. The State Department was cautious in its discussions
on cutting the sugar quota because the 1943 bilateral trade agreement between the
United States and Cuba required a six-month notice for terminating the trade of any
specific good. Terminating the agreement with disregard for the six-month notice could
be a risky move because it would send the message to Cuba that the United States
government refused to be fair. However, there was a way for the United States to elude
the six-month notice obligation: by having the president declare a “state of emergency”
and implement the Trading with the Enemy Act. This would immediately halt all trade
between the two nations. The drawback of such a move is that it would be quite
aggressive and also would commit the United States to labeling Cuba an official enemy.
Identifying Cuba as an enemy prior to Castro declaring the nation communist could
cause potential problems in the future and would cause the United States to appear
quarrelsome, which is the opposite image the State Department was aiming to project.
The State Department anticipated that declaring a state of emergency or
instituting the sugar amendment might cause Castro to retaliate by expropriating U.S.
owned oil refineries, and sugar mills. If Castro chose to retaliate in this way, the State
Department planned to urge other government officials and agencies to “refrain from
any extreme overt retaliation, [this way] we would be the aggrieved party.” 127
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Secretary Anderson of the U.S. Treasury agreed that the United States should
refrain from retaliation in the event Castro expropriated U.S. properties and businesses.
However, he along with Secretary of State Christian Herter believed that the cut in the
sugar quota alone would not solve anything and suggested “going all the way” and
eliminating all trade with Cuba. He argued that eliminating the trade of one product at a
time would allow Castro time to pick up the slack in between each economic blow.
Thus, it would have little overall effect on the economy. Secretary Anderson argued that
“Nibbling is no good; we should either take actions which will hurt or leave well enough
alone.” 128 The State Department as a whole chose to neither implement solely the
sugar amendment nor “go all the way”. Instead they opted for a plan that provided
continuous economic blows in quick succession as to not allow Cuba the chance to
recover between each act of economic sabotage. The State Department insisted that
It is important that the U.S. Government maintain its dignity and that any action
which it may take should not be as a result of a stampede or panic; it should
be, rather, a relentless, firm pressure, a steady turning of the screw, in a spirit
of lamentation and sorrow rather than anger. . . we should try to use economic
bullets rather than real ones. 129
On June 27, 1960, congress initiated the push to pass an amended sugar act
including a passage which would allow President Eisenhower to eliminate the sugar
quota all together. The U.S State Department’s assumptions were realized two days
later, on June 29, 1960, when Fidel Castro nationalized all oil refineries owned by U.S.
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companies which included Texaco, Shell and Esso.130 This came earlier than
anticipated. The State Department projected that Castro would expropriate American oil
refineries after the sugar quota was cut. It appeared Fidel Castro was wasting no time
and was aggressively perusing the goals of his revolution. The oil refineries, however,
were only the tip of the iceberg. On July 5, 1950 Castro nationalized all U.S owned
businesses and commercial property in Cuba.131 President Eisenhower then had no
choice but to act.
One day after Castro nationalized the U.S. businesses, President Eisenhower
declared the cut of the sugar quota. In numbers, this meant that the U.S. government
officially declined to purchase 700,000 tons of sugar from Cuba in the 1960 calendar
year. The United States government did not give Cuba a six-month notice and did not
declare a state of emergency. Rather, the President cut the sugar quota disregarding
any courtesies outlined in previous trade agreements, as a result of Castro’s recent
appropriations of U.S. businesses and property. The President stated:
Normally about one-third of our total sugar supply comes from Cuba. Despite
every effort on our part to maintain traditionally friendly relations, the Government
of Cuba is now following a course which raises serious questions as to whether
the United States can, in the long run, continue to rely upon that country for such
large quantities of sugar. I believe that we would fail in our obligation to our
people if we did not take steps to reduce our reliance for a major food product
upon a nation which has embarked upon a deliberate policy of hostility toward
the United States. 132

The President continued by announcing that the U.S. would give their business
to other countries on the world market to replace the 700,000 tons of sugar they
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declined to purchase from Cuba. He further announced that the decision to cut the
sugar quota was also influenced by the claim that Cuba had been trading with the
Soviet Union and was using sugar as a currency. With that in mind the President was
unsure how long Cuba would have been able to continue exporting sugar to the U.S. if
they were shipping mass quantities to the Soviets. Thus, the President claimed he and
fellow government officials including economic analysts were uncomfortable relying on
Cuba because the United States would face a sugar shortage if Cuba were to run out of
sugar. President Eisenhower closed his address by stating “The American people will
always maintain their friendly feelings for the people of Cuba. We look forward to the
day when the Cuban Government will once again allow this friendship to be fully
expressed in the relations between our two countries.”133 The President’s aspiration to
reconcile with Cuba proved to be an unrealistic goal in the summer of 1960. Three days
after Eisenhower cut the sugar quota, the Soviet Union emerged from behind their iron
curtain to deliver a message to the United States.
On July 9, 1960 Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet Premier announced “If
necessary, Soviet artillery men can support the Cuban people with their rocket fire if
aggressive forces dare to start an intervention against Cuba” and followed that
statement by agreeing to purchase from Cuba, the 700,000 tons of sugar that was
designated to be sold to the United States.134 Che Guevara and Fidel Castro made
statements regarding the Soviet embrace of their regime. Guevara boasted “Cuba today
is a glorious island defended by the rockets of the greatest military power in history. .
.We are practically the arbiters of world peace.” Fidel on the other hand used
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Khrushchev’s statement to boast of the greatness of the Cuban people and their ideals.
He stated, “Cuba does not depend for the defense of its sovereignty and independence
on Soviet rockets, but rather on the reason and justice of its cause.”

135

While the CIA estimated that many Cubans from the educated and elite class
were opposed to the alliance with the Soviet Union, they argued that Cuba inched
closer every day, to becoming a dictatorship run by communists. Finally, the CIA feared
that Castro would put the good of the people second to his “greater ambition—
humiliation of [the] U.S., wrecking of [the] inter-American system and eventual
‘liberation’ of all Latin America.”136
After Khrushchev’s warning and subsequent comments by Cuban leaders, the
CIA reported that these recent events “plunged US-Cuban relations into their most
critical phase to date.”137 The CIA also feared that the recent events in Cuba had ignited
a new fire in Castro’s anti-American campaign and increased national support of the
revolution. Furthermore, the CIA realized that cutting the sugar quota did not have the
debilitating effect on the Cuban economy like the U.S. government had hoped. Instead,
terminating the sugar quota only increased Cuba’s dependency on the Soviet Union.
Given the circumstances, the CIA believed that Castro was certainly more likely to sever
all ties with the United States than he was to back down from the fight and restore
relations. 138 Angered and frustrated, officials in the U.S. government sought to submit a
complain to the United Nations and the Organization of American States suggesting that
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two agencies examine the current situation in Cuba. Such a move, however, would not
produce any tangible results, and would likely aggravate Castro further. Therefore, the
CIA decided it was time something be done to eliminate Castro.
In August of 1960 the CIA began taking measures to plan the assassination of
Fidel Castro. The first plan, designed in early August, involved recruiting men from the
American mafia and the criminal underworld assist in the planning. The man chosen
was Robert Maheu, an ex-FBI agent who the CIA considered “tough enough” for the
job. Robert Maheu asked the CIA if he could enlist the help of John Rosselli, a fellow
American with Las Vegas underworld connections to assist him. The CIA obliged. With
the help of the CIA Maheu and Rosselli began planning the assassination and recruited
Cubans who opposed Castro to commit the official assassination. The assassination
was to be executed by dropping a poisoned pill into Castro’s food or drink and was
planned to be carried out in November of 1960. From 1960 to 1965 there were at least
eight known attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro in which the CIA was involved.
Besides the poisoned pills, there were also poisoned cigars, bacterial powders, a
poisoned pen and attacks involving more traditional weapons such as guns. 139
In the meantime, while the CIA set in motion plans for an assassination, the
rest of the U.S. government prepared for Fidel Castro’s arrival in New York for the
United Nations conference in September of 1960. On September 26, Castro made a
four-hour address to the United Nations. In his speech he covered the colonial history of
Cuba up to Batista’s rule, retold the story of the revolution, and announced both the
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economic and militaristic assaults on Cuba since he became the leader of the nation.
He also went on to describe the ways in which the quality of life for Cubans had greatly
improved since Batista’s overthrow. Castro then opened his verbal onslaught of the
United States with the following passage: “It has been proved that revolutions do not
ruin countries, and that imperialist governments do try to ruin countries. Cuba had not
been ruined; she therefore had to be ruined.”140 He then went on to deliver a play by
play of the relationship between the United States and Cuba since he took the position
of Prime Minister and began enacting new legislation for Cuba. When he arrived at the
delicate topic of drafting trade agreements with the Soviet Union he stated, “We really
did not have to ask permission from the State Department in order to sign a trade treaty
with the Soviet Union, because we considered ourselves, and we continue to consider
ourselves, and we will always consider ourselves, a truly independent and free
country.”141 In the rest of his speech he maneuvered through Cuba’s position on other
international issues like the 1960 status of the Congo and the Republic of China’s
admission into the United nations. Finally, he ended his address by declaring Cuba’s
position on international politics and foreign relations: “We are, and always shall be for
everything that is just: against colonialism, exploitation, monopolies, militarism, the
armaments race, and warmongering. We shall always be against such things. That will
be our position.” 142It was with that statement that Castro exited the United Nations
meeting and left home to Cuba two days later. Upon arriving home Castro was met with
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more aerial bombs from the United States and in mid-October, he filed a formal
complaint to the United Nations against the United States for aerial aggression.
From the CIA’s perspective, Castro had become a bigger threat than ever. The
CIA reported in October of 1960 that Cuba had received large arms shipments from the
Soviet Union. Some of the specific items reported to have been delivered to Havana
harbor were rocket arms, small electric plants, radar equipment, aircraft parts,
bazookas, long-range reflectors and other small weapons. 143 Therefore, the plan to
assassinate Castro was vitally important to the CIA in the fall of 1960. They had
arranged for one hundred and fifty thousand dollars to be paid to the men who
successfully delivered poisoned pills to Castro. The official plan was to get the poisoned
pills to men within Cuba who had access to Castro and instruct them to contaminate
Castro’s food with the pills. The CIA reported that they insisted on using poisoned pills
because they would not be able to convince anyone to accept the mission if they were
mandated to use gunfire because their own chance of survival would have been slim.
The plan to assassinate Castro in the fall of 1960 fell through because the CIA could not
get their personnel and syndicates organized quickly enough to finish the job. 144
Therefore they waited in the wings for another opportunity.
The State Department on the other hand, again chose to not engage in violent
acts against Cuba, but rather to initiate more economic attacks. The State Department
drafted an action plan and presented it to President Eisenhower on October 13, 1960.
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The plan was to prohibit all U.S. exports to Cuba with the exception of medical supplies
and staple food stuffs. Officials in the State Department did not believe that such
embargo could end the Castro regime, but it would put added pressure on Cuban
government officials. Additionally, it would not be categorized as an “intervention” so as
not to initiate any military confrontation from the Soviet Union. There were a couple of
cons associated with the State Departments proposed plan. First, the president was
concerned with the reaction of other Latin American countries. Any that had strong
communist movements would be disgruntled over the matter and the president hoped
that they could justify the embargo well enough to avoid criticism. The second problem
is that the President feared that the proposed embargo would appear to be an attack on
the Cuban people, rather than an attempt to cripple the Castro regime.145 The State
Department did not want the Cuban people to feel abandoned, which is why they
proposed to make exceptions for exports of medical supplies and staple foods. The
President hoped he could frame the embargo in such a way that it would not cause
violent retaliation from any party.
President Eisenhower enacted the partial embargo on U.S. exports to Cuba on
October 19, 1960 and, in response, Castro nationalized the rest of American properties
in Cuba on October 24, 1960.146 In the weeks following the partial embargo, Cuba and
the Soviet Union caught wind of a plan for the United States to invade Cuba and
reported it to the United Nations. The United Nations responded by stating that Cuba’s
charges against the United States were “monstrous distortions and downright
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falsehoods” and argued that the United States posed no threat to Cuba. It is curious that
the United Nations believed that the United States posed no threat to Cuba because a
vast amount of information on the impending Cuban invasion had been leaked from the
U.S. government. Castro had received evidence from informants that the United States
had organized training bases in Guatemala to prepare a Cuban opposition force for an
invasion. The State Department was rattled by the intelligence leak and as a result
proposed moving the trainings out of Guatemala and establishing training centers in the
United States that could provide more security. 147 However, in late November of 1960,
President elect John F. Kennedy was briefed on the official invasion plan of Cuba.
By the first week of December of 1960 the State Department received a
dispatch from the Embassy in Cuba containing hard truths about the reality of the
relationship between the United States and Cuba. Due to the contents of the dispatch
the State Department came to terms with the fact that conciliation was not an option to
solving the problems between the two nations. They also realized that time would not
solve the problem because Cuba had not felt the sting of the economic blows because
they received immediate economic support from the Soviet Union. Finally, the State
Department believed that an armed invasion would not likely be successful because
Castro has extended “government control over all aspects of the economic and social
structure, [enacted] massive and skillful use of propaganda and drastically suppressed
all individual liberties.”148 In order for the United States to obtain a desired outcome in
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Cuba, the government needed to pursue one of three options. The first was to negotiate
a settlement with Cuba to meet the demands of each country. The second was to
continue to observe the Cuban situation under the assumption that an opposition force
will push for new policies in Cuba. The third option was for the United States to
orchestrate the overthrow of Fidel Castro. 149
The State Department chose to go with the third option. This option aligned
closely with the CIA’s plan to invade Cuba, which had been in the works since the
Spring of 1960. However, the State Department’s approach to overthrowing the Castro
regime was slightly different. The State Department laid out three steps to fulfilling the
goal. The first was to further tighten economic sanctions against Cuba. Next, they would
prepare and distribute massive amounts of Anti-Castro propaganda, followed by the
termination of all diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Cuba. Lastly, the State
department would encourage and strengthen the Cuban opposition force.150 Their
approach is still different from the CIA’s because the CIA used a hands-on strategy and
organized the official training of opposition forces, whereas the State Department opted
for a hands-off approach acting as the opposition’s glorified cheerleaders.
In mid-December of 1960 the State Department began having conversations
about terminating diplomatic relations with Cuba. There were two unfortunate cons to
breaking diplomatic ties. First was that the U.S. Embassy was valuable in forwarding
intelligence on Cuba’s military, economy, and policy changes to United States officials
in Washington D.C. If relations ceased, the U.S. officials would not have as much
access to Cuban intel and would instead have to rely mostly on anti-Castro informants.
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Second was that American embassy in Cuba served as a physical symbol of the
resistance to the Castro regime. A vacant embassy would send the message that the
United States had given up the fight and had abandoned any anti-Castro Cubans still
left on the island.
Despite the downsides, the State Department was easily persuaded to favor a
break in diplomatic relations for a number of reasons. First, they realized that tighter
policies had made it more difficult for the Embassy in Cuba to distribute information to
Cuban citizens, thus the embassy did them little good in communicating to the people.
Second, since Castro had nationalized all U.S. properties in Cuba, U.S. businesses had
little influence over the decision to maintain diplomatic relations. Third, most of the antiCastro Cubans had already left Cuba or had decided to leave in the coming months
which meant that the U.S. had few friends left on the island. Finally, breaking diplomatic
ties with Cuba would cause the United States less embarrassment in the long run
because any U.S. backed invasion wouldn’t be as ill-received by the rest of the world if
the United States and Cuba had no diplomatic relationship.151 The year 1960 ended
with diplomatic relations between the United States in Cuba still in-tact, but that was to
be short lived.
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Chapter 4
Kennedy, Castro, & Combat

Diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba finally broke on
January 3, 1961.152 This meant that the two countries would no longer have any formal
dealings or communication and would not have government workers stationed in each
other’s nations. Therefore, the Kennedy administration had their work cut out for them
because they would have no access to intel directly from Cuba and would have to
strategically gather information from secret informants.
President-elect John F. Kennedy met with President Eisenhower on the eve of
Kennedy’s inauguration to discuss the Cuban situation. Eisenhower informed Castro
that the United States had organized an opposition movement and band of cadres
scheduled to invade Cuba with the intent of overthrowing the Castro regime. He detailed
that the cadres were being trained in a remote facility in the interior of Guatemala and
were on track to initiate an invasion in the spring of 1961. He urged Kennedy to pursue
and accelerate the program and invasion plan. Finally, Eisenhower left Kennedy with his
formidable opinion that the Castro administration could continue to exist in Cuba for
long without becoming dangerous, possibly lethal to the United States. 153
During Kennedy’s inaugural address, he tactfully stated his position on
communism, the Soviet Union and Cuba, without directly calling upon certain groups or
countries. He stated:
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Let every other power know that this Hemisphere intends to remain the master of
its own house. . . Finally, to those nations who would make themselves our
adversary, we offer not a pledge but a request: that both sides begin anew the
quest for peace, before the dark powers of destruction unleashed by science
engulf all humanity in planned or accidental self-destruction. 154

In this passage, Kennedy pointed out that it was his goal to maintain
democracy in the Western Hemisphere and to not let forces from the East creep in and
take over his “house.” Kennedy essentially equates the United States with the entire
Western Hemisphere. Thus, positioning the United States as the leader and policing
agent of the Western Hemisphere. He then followed up by offering a proposal to work
on mending relationships with enemy countries before the threat of nuclear war arises.
Castro listened in as Kennedy delivered his proposal to “begin anew” with Cuba and
Castro welcomed Kennedy’s proposal. He even went so far as to demobilize the Cuban
militia because he assumed there was no longer a threat for a U.S. invasion.155 To his
dismay, Kennedy had not recalled the invasion plans and had not decelerated the
invasion’s timeline.
The propaganda campaign in Cuba was still high on the list of priorities for the
CIA and the National Security Council. They intensified their original plan of radio
broadcasts and pamphlets as the main methods of propaganda distribution. The
propaganda was meant primarily to encourage anti-Castro Cubans to stay confident
and to encourage more people to join the fight against the Castro regime, especially in
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the months leading up to the invasion. 156 However, much of the distributed materials
actually had the opposite effect. United States officials believed more of the propaganda
than the Cubans, and many Cubans were rather offended by the propaganda because
Castro had renewed historic nationalism in the people of Cuba. Therefore, many
Cubans did not buy into the propaganda distributed by opposition groups or the United
States. Much of the Invasion planned by the CIA was done so with CIA officials under
the impression that there was opposition against Castro already brewing in the island. 157
In hindsight however, that was not the case.
By March of 1961 the CIA had an intricate plan laid out for anti-Castro forces to
invade Cuba. They called the mission “Operation Zapata.” The invasion date was set for
mid-April of 1961. The CIA chose Playa Girón, or the “Bay of Pigs” for numerous
reasons. The first was that the landscape surrounding the coast was filled with mostly
wetland, filled with bogs and swamp. This would make it a difficult location for Castro to
defend because vehicles could not navigate through the terrain. The CIA also favored
the Bay of Pigs over other locations because it was centrally located on the island. This
was beneficial because if the opposition was victorious, a central location such as the
Bay of Pigs was an ideal epicenter from which anti-Castro sentiments to spread
throughout the island. Lastly, the Bay of Pigs offered multiple landing zones for aircrafts.
There were two landing strips nearby and a few strips of beach that could serve as
landing strips if needed. 158
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The time of the initial landing was planned to be at night as to allow the most
time for unloading supplies before being discovered by Castro’s militia. The assault of
Castro’s air force was to begin the following morning. After Castro’s air force was
destroyed, the CIA’s next step was to move the command ships into the harbor of the
bay. They estimated that within seventy-two hours of the initial attack, the fighting would
cease, and the U.S. could set up a provisional government at Playa Girón. 159
The Department of Defense evaluated the plan proposed by the CIA and
pointed out potential disadvantages of the mission. First, the Chiefs of Staff identified
that the landing strips surrounding Playa Girón were inadequate for B-26 planes.
Second, there was no air operations base factored into the plan therefore, anticipating
oncoming air attacks from Castro’s forces would be difficult and nearly impossible.
Third, they argued that it would be difficult for amateur pilots with minimal training to
navigate at night and successfully execute a landing. 160 However, though there were
risks and disadvantages to the plan, it was the best plan the U.S. Government had.
Thus, they pursued it and continued to prepare for the invasion, which was only one
month away.
Only five short days before the attack, the President’s special assistant Arthur
Schlesinger reported to the president, his concerns about the operation and what it
would mean for the United States—win or lose. He encouraged Kennedy to stall the
invasion so there was more time to adequately plan. He was concerned that the
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planning, beyond the initial attack, was lacking critical elements. He suggested including
political, diplomatic and economic plans which could be set in motion after the
provisional government was established, and such plans should be drafted by May 1,
1961. The absence of these plans would likely cause much confrontation from
revolutionary Cubans, and much criticism from the world. He went on to say such a
forceful invasion should only be initiated if Cuba presented a “demonstrable and
convincing” threat to U.S. national security, which Schlesinger was skeptical about. He
reported:
A great many people simply do not at this moment see that Cuba presents so
grave and compelling a threat to our national security as to justify a course of
action which much of the world will interpret as calculated aggression against a
small nation in defiance both of treaty obligations and of the international
standards we have repeatedly asserted against the Communist world.161
Thus, Schlesinger suggested to president Kennedy, that the United States
government would appear hypocritical if they invaded Cuba because they so intensely
criticized communist nations for violations of international standards. He was immensely
concerned about the image of the United States and the image of the Kennedy
administration. He additionally pointed out that Kennedy had changed the way
Americans thought about government and had impacted foreign relations in a positive
way. Further he described the government under Kennedy as one that has emerged
“again as a great, mature and liberal nation, coolly and intelligently dedicated to the job
of stopping Communism, strengthening the free and neutral nations and working for
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peace.”162 In order to preserve the positive image of the Kennedy administration and of
the U.S. as a whole, Schlesinger urged Kennedy to reconsider Operation Zapata and
encouraged him to objectively weigh the pros and cons of pursuing the invasion. Finally,
he added “people will assume that our action is provoked by a threat to something other
than our security. . . they will assume that we are acting, not to protect our safety, but to
protect our property and investments.”163
Schlesinger was not alone in his concerns and was also not alone in his opinion
that Operation Zapata should be reconsidered. Undersecretary of State Chester Bowles
believed that U.S. national interests would not benefit from a cover operation like the
one the CIA planned against Cuba. He suggested that the world’s opinion of Kennedy
was too high to jeopardize over an operation from which he suggested there was little to
gain. Bowels also brought up another point made by Schlesinger: the hypocrisy of it all.
He cited the Act of Bogota, signed in September of 1960 in the Organization of
American States agreements. It stated:
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for
any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The
foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of
interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State or against its
political, economic and cultural elements.164

Therefore, Bowels, of the U.S. State Department, argued that the United States should
keep to its word and keep out of Cuba. It would be difficult to condemn the communists
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for building empires, if the United States were invading countries who arguably posed
little threat to U.S. national security. He commented on how treaty conditions should be
recognized as binding law, and that President Kennedy had garnered much world
support by being a man of principle.
Other members of the State Department such as Assistant Secretary of
State Thomas Mann opposed the invasion. Mann was skeptical about the invasion and
suggested that garnering enough support for an uprising against the Castro regime was
an unrealistic goal because Castro had already garnered the support of most Cubans
on the Island. Many government officials underestimated how many Cubans truly
supported Castro.165 In addition to Mann, Senator J. William Fulbright made the
comment that “The Castro regime is a thorn in the flesh, but it is not a dagger to the
heart.”166 Therefore Fulbright viewed Cuba as more of an annoyance than a violent
country posing a threat to the United States.
It is apparent that U.S. government officials had differing opinions on whether or
not to invade Cuba. Allen Dulles and the CIA were neck deep in their invasion plans and
were committed to act on them, while other government officials offered several reasons
to abandon the mission. Nonetheless, it appears that no government officials opposed
the mission because they believed it was wrong to invade Cuba but were instead
worried that the invasion would end in failure or that the reputation of the United States
would be tarnished as a result of the coup.
From the time Castro took over Cuba, the State Department and the CIA had
differing opinions on how the new revolutionary regime should be handled. The State
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Department erred on the side of caution and aimed to solve issues between the United
States and Cuba diplomatically, rather than using methods of aggression such as an
invasion. In contrast, the CIA began planning Operation Zapata during the Eisenhower
administration, before Castro nationalized U.S. oil refineries, before Castro nationalized
all U.S. businesses, and before Cuba established concrete sugar trade agreements with
the Soviet Union. CIA Director Allen Dulles was consumed by the task of containing
communism and determined the timing of Castro publicly declaring himself a communist
to be irrelevant because Dulles insisted Castro’s regime was flooded with communist
underpinnings all along.167 Therefore Dulles believed that communism existed in Cuba,
regardless of whether or not the leader of the movement was a declared communist.
These facts illustrate that the CIA’s decision to overthrow the Castro regime was
made prior to the occurrence of many serious points of contention between the United
States and Cuba throughout 1960. Thus, the decision to invade was based on the
presumption of communism and the threat that a full communist takeover of Cuba would
result in a loss of profit for the United States. Therefore, the CIA felt the need to “nip it in
the bud” and overthrow Castro before he had the chance to strip the United States of its
investments in Cuba. Dulles had a “do onto others before they do it to you” mentality.
The CIA thus favored military coup, rather than a diplomatic avenue from the start and
by April of 1961 their plan was ready to be set in action. The attempts made by the
State Department and other government officials to stall or stop the invasion were
ineffective, as the CIA decided not to recall their plan to invade Cuba. Therefore, the
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CIA made their final adjustments to the plan, and prepared the opposition force for
battle.
The invasion officially began on April 15, 1961. The opposition arrived in the
night and staged a series of air attacks on Cuban military targets. The goal in beginning
the invasion with an air attack was to destroy military equipment and arms in hopes that
Castro and his revolutionary militia would not be able to adequately fend off the attack.
The CIA logically presumed that if Cuban planes were destroyed, it would be more
difficult for the Cuban revolutionaries to defend themselves against an assault from
opposition forces. However, Cuba’s military equipment withstood the attack and
Castro’s aircrafts, his most valuable weapons, emerged unscathed. 168
Arguably one of the devastating mistakes of the ground invasion was that the
Cuban exiles waited two days after the airstrike to begin their attack on land. Because
Castro’s air force was not destroyed by the initial air attack, the two-day lull gave
Castro’s forces time to organize and respond. Therefore, on the night of April 17, 1961
when the opposition made their land attack and converged on Playa Girón, the Cuban
revolutionaries were ready to strike back. Regardless of the odds, the opposition fought
valiantly and trekked inland for two days, taking constant abuse from Castro’s tanks and
heavy artillery. By the end of the day on April 19 , 1961 Castro’s forces had pushed the
opposition back to Playa Girón, the beach from which they attacked. The command
ships stationed in the harbor sent many messages to the CIA communicating that they
needed help, were out of ammunition, and were quickly running out of manpower. The
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troops repeatedly begged for help from the United States government and their pleas
went unanswered by President Kennedy who declined to admit the United States had
any involvement in the plot to invade Cuba.
The command ships stationed in the harbor sent one final message to the CIA
before being destroyed by an assault from Castro’s air force. That message was
“Castro is waiting on the beach.”169 With that, the opposition’s command ships were
destroyed, their extra ammunition, arms and other materials were sunk in the bay, and
their fight was in its final hour. At that point, the practicality of a successful completion of
the mission declined quickly and Castro’s forces easily defeated the opposition,
resulting in an embarrassing defeat for the anti-Castro invaders. 170
Another interestingly weak point of the invasion was that the United States
anticipated that anti-Castro Cubans would join the fight against the revolutionary
militias, and that Cubans who previously supported Castro would be enlightened by the
democratic beliefs of the opposition and turn against the revolution. However, the CIA
misjudged how committed the majority of Cubans were to the revolution. Thus, the
revolutionaries would likely fight harder to defend their territory against invaders.
Second, the Cubans who were opposed to the Castro regime were not likely to come
forward and join the fight because of their faith in the United States military. Many
Cubans who supported the U.S. believed that the U.S in all of its military glory could and
would overthrow the regime with little effort. Therefore, they could not justify fighting in
the battle themselves. 171
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After the dust had settled at Playa Girón, Fidel Castro once again approached
the podium to address the Cuban people and debrief the recent battle. Castro explained
how the United States’ plan to destabilize Cuba had come in three stages. The U.S.
had first used tactics of economic aggression, followed by acts of “terrorism” in the form
of bombs over the cane fields, and had come to a head with direct aggression in the
form of an invasion of Cuba. Castro spoke about Kennedy in a disappointed yet strong
manner. He stated:
We awaited his inauguration to see if he would do something different. We did
not believe that he would continue with the errors of the previous administration.
He himself said: “Let us begin anew.” He did not begin anew; he began as of old.
He not only followed the policy of Eisenhower, but he was even more aggressive
against us. This gentleman has brought this problem on himself, through his lack
of common sense. He has earned this discredit all by himself. While we waited
for him to show what policy he was going to follow, he increased the attacks
against us. He increased in intensity the aggression against our country. 172

After Cuba declared itself communist, and the Bay of Pigs invasion failed,
President Kennedy took full responsibility for the failure. The newly appointed Secretary
of State, Dean Rusk, was disheartened by the failure and stated that the events at
Playa Girón were “one hell of a way to close out my first hundred days as Secretary of
State.”173 Shortly after the Bay of Pigs invasion, Kennedy organized a group of men to
debrief the operation and investigate what could have been done to make the invasion
more effective. The men assigned to the commission were Maxwell Taylor, Robert
Kennedy, Allen Dulles, and Arleigh Burke. The commission investigated the short
comings of the invasion and drew the conclusion that a special strategic committee was
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needed in order to stage future invasions like the Bay of Pigs. The commission also
reported to the president that they believed the United States was losing the Cold War
on all fronts and the only way to combat that is to unite all of the forces within the
executive branch and work together against U.S. enemies.

174

The United States was indeed losing ground in the Cold War, or at least failing
to contain the spread of Communism. On May 2, 1961, Fidel Castro declared Cuba a
communist nation and set an agenda to being drafting a new socialist constitution for
Cuba. In addition to the socialist constitution, Castro argued that the people of Cuba did
not have time for elections because they were too busy fighting off North American
imperialists. He added that Cuba had no used for political parties other than the
revolutionary party because the presence of multiple political parties in Cuba was “Just
an expression of class interests.” He further argued “Here there is just one class, the
humble; that class is in power and so it is not interested in the ambition of an exploiting
minority to get back in power. Those people would have no chance at all in an election.”
He closed the discussion on open elections by stating “The revolution has no time to
waste in such foolishness.” 175
The U.S. government responded to the recent events in Cuba with a new plan
of how to proceed. The department of State provided two options for dealing with Cuba.
The first was the immediate elimination of Fidel Castro. The second was a long-term
isolation and containment plan which would ideally lead to an uprising by the Cuban
people. The State Department favored option two. The first step in their action plan was
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to initiate an “Alliance for Progress” which was an organization meant to foster
cooperation between the United States and Latin American countries. By developing
this organization, it would strengthen the relationship with the U.S. and Latin America
while pushing Cuba into the dark and isolating it from the rest of Latin America.
The second step was to construct a new façade for the United States. The
State Department wanted Cuba and the world to believe that the U.S had abandoned
the idea of an intervention and did not mean any harm. They further wanted their
audience to believe that the United States number one objective in the Cuban dilemma
was to see the Cuban people freed from oppression by Castro and from Soviet
domination. To reach their goals, it became more apparent to the State Department that
the United States should apply the “Trading with the Enemy Act” to Cuba, which would
gradually reduce the few exports the United States sold to Cuba in 1961 such as food
stuffs and medical supplies.
Lastly, the State Department suggested that the United States train freedom
fighters to initiate a counter-revolutionary movement within Cuba itself. In order to
accomplish this however, government agencies needed to get more intel. If the United
States were to again invade Cuba, the State Department declared that it would be on
overt operation and the United States would no longer hide behind the mask of a Cuban
opposition force. 176
Months after the State Department devised their updated plan, the CIA began
working on a new operation: Operation Mongoose. Chester Bowels of the State
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Department suggested that Operation Mongoose was a “higher-level failure” than the
Bay of Pigs invasion, meaning it would have greater repercussions in the event of
failure on the part of the United States. 177 The basics of Operation Mongoose were
quite similar to the plan designed by the State Department. The goal was to initiate a
rebellion against Castro resulting in a revolt of the Cuban people against the Castro
regime.
The first step in the Operation Mongoose was to establish a democratic political
movement in Cuba. The political movement would then be coupled with economic
sabotage, and psychological warfare to turn Castro’s people against him. One of the
major economic blows in Operation Mongoose was when Kennedy instated a full
economic embargo against Cuba in February of 1962. 178 The embargo has remained
the symbol of U.S. hostility toward Cuba.
Robert F. Kennedy was appointed by John F. Kennedy to spearhead the CIA’s
Operation Mongoose. After the economic embargo, Operation Mongoose quickly turned
from destabilizing the Cuban economy, political atmosphere, and regime to another
assassination attempt of Fidel Castro. There were several assassination attempts that
stemmed from Operation Mongoose. Some of which were exploding conch shells,
poisoned pens, sniper rifles, and the ever-creative fungus-infected scuba gear to be
given as gift to Castro.179 It is unconfirmed whether John F. Kennedy and Robert F.
Kennedy knew about or approved of the assassination plans, or whether the CIA acted
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alone. However, it is likely that the late President and his brother were somehow
involved.
The CIA therefore continued their pattern of hostility toward Cuba throughout
much of the Kennedy administration, while the State Department allowed events to
unfold and veered away from using force. However, though the CIA and the State
Department had different approaches in dealing with Fidel Castro and his nation, none
of the strategies were effective. Cuba combatted the economic blows with Soviet trade
agreements and combatted the physical invasion using strategies similar to those the
revolutionaries had used to come to power in the first place.

88

Chapter 5
At the Brink and Beyond

The year 1962 was the point of no return for the United States and Cuba. All
the past issues came to a head during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Kennedy was first
informed about the missiles on October 14, 1962 after a U-2 spy plane completed a sixminute fly over of the island and captured photographs of a nuclear missile site. The
CIA and the president kept the information secret until the issue was better investigated
as not to panic the American people.180
It was alarming for the president and government officials who were in the
know, because nuclear weapons were the most destructive and powerful weapons in
the world. After the second world war, officials tried desperately keep the United States
the exclusive global owner of nuclear technology. The Soviet Union quickly developed
nuclear weapons of their own and were then a major threat to the United States.
However, the Soviet Union did not possess missiles that were in range of targeting the
United States with an attack until they placed missiles in Cuba in the fall of 1962. The
United States saw this as an act of aggression both on the part of the Soviet Union and
on the part of Cuba. The result of a nuclear attack from missiles launched in Cuba
would be devastating to the United States. If attacked, the United States would have
presumably retaliated with equal force. The result of such an exchange may have
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resulted in mutually assured destruction for both the United States and the Soviet
Union.
While Kennedy contemplated what to make of his newly acquired information,
Khrushchev sent a telegram to the United States asking why Kennedy was so afraid of
Cuba. He argued that the United States was such a prominent and powerful nation that
it should never realistically fear a small island such ask Cuba.181 However, it was not
necessarily Cuba that the United States feared, but rather, their alliance with the Soviet
bloc.
Khrushchev further maintained that two great nations such as the Soviet Union
and the United States should be reasonable and should not push around small
countries and force them to adhere to the same values and same style of government
as the larger power. He pointed out that the Soviet Union would never agree with
capitalism just as America would never agree with communism. He further suggested
for both countries to not interfere with the internal affairs of smaller countries and for the
United States and the Soviet Union to live in relative peace.182 Khrushchev may have
strategically staged this telegram because he knew that if U.S. officials had not already
discovered the Soviet missiles in Cuba, they soon would. This conversation then could
be used as leverage to argue that the Soviet Union did not aim to militarily harm the
United States, but simply level the playing field, as the United States had a missile base
in Turkey.
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By October 19, 1962, the CIA had produced a special national intelligence
estimate on the missiles in Cuba. The CIA suggested that the Soviet Union installed the
missiles in Cuba so they could use them as a bargaining chip. More specifically, the CIA
anticipated that the Soviet Union would offer to trade Cuba for Berlin. Berlin was much
more valuable to the Soviet Union both because it was geographically closer to the
Soviet Union, and because the Soviet Union already controlled the eastern half of
Berlin. Therefore, in the event of a trade, Berlin would be consolidated under Soviet
rule. Cuba, on the other hand was closer to the United States, and the U.S. had been
invested in the territory for decades. To the Soviets, trading Berlin for Cuba seemed like
a win-win. The United States, however, did not see it that way and the CIA reported that
the United States government would decline any offer to trade the two territories.
The CIA’s national intelligence report stated that if the United States allowed
the missile build-up to continue in Cuba, it would give momentum to the global
communist movement. It would open the door for other communist countries to
welcome the construction of missile bases in their counties. Furthermore, the CIA
argued if the United States tolerated the presence of missiles in Cuba, it would cause
the world to question why and make the United States appear weak and defeated by
the communists. Therefore, the CIA thought it necessary to stage an attack on Cuba in
order to forcibly remove the missiles from the island. The CIA thought it would be more
effective to launch a surprise attack rather than to send a warning to Khrushchev or
Castro. The CIA anticipated that the United States would have a better chance of
victory, if the enemy were not expecting the attack. 183
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While the CIA discussed an attack on Cuba, Secretary of State Dean Rusk
presented a different strategy. Rusk suggested that the United States establish a
quarantine zone in the international waters surrounding Cuba. This quarantine zone
would serve as a blockade, guarding the Cuban ports from receiving any materials from
the Soviet Union meant to contribute to the construction of the missiles on the island.
The blockade would ensure that the missile construction was halted while the United
States and the Soviet Union sorted out the situation. The State Department, like other
government agencies, was desperate to remove missiles from the island, however, the
State Department opposed an invasion or an attack as a means to reach that end. 184
After the CIA’s last invasion failed miserably, Kennedy thought it wise to go with the
State Department’s recommendation and stage a blockade of naval ships around the
island. This way, Kennedy could be sure that the work on the missile was halted. 185
Negotiations between Kennedy and Khrushchev continued for thirteen days.
Many Americans considered those to be some of the most stressful days the world had
ever seen. Americans were preparing for nuclear war like never before. They were
stocking their bomb shelters with canned goods and drinking water. People across the
nation understood that one wrong move on the part of either party could have been
catastrophic for the world. On October 28, 1962 Khrushchev sent a message to
president Kennedy proposing that if the United States agreed to not invade Cuba, then
the Soviet Union would remove their missiles from the island. The Soviet Union also
requested that the United States remove their missiles from Turkey. President Kennedy
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initially agreed to only the first term, thus ruling out any future Cuban invasions.
Kennedy however took an additionally two days to think over the request to remove
American missiles from Turkey. In the final days of October 1963, the two countries
signed nuclear treaties and agreed to establish a hot line between Washington and
Moscow in hopes that future conflicts could be handled with more ease.
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The CIA, however, could not let the idea of a physical invasion go. John
McCone, CIA director and other officials tried desperately to keep President Kennedy
from signing the agreement with the Soviet Union which banned the United States from
invading Cuba.187 They could not let an opportunity for redemption of their failure at
Playa Girón slip away. To the CIA’s dismay, the president did indeed sign the
agreement, which halted all plans of a Cuba invasion from the CIA. Their attempt to
hinder Kennedy from signing away their last hope of victory suggests that the CIA
valued the possibility of a future invasion of Cuba more than settling one of the most
stressful situations of the twentieth century.
The end of the missile crisis also brought about the end of Operation
Mongoose. With the hope of a military invasion of Cuba off the table and the full
economic embargo already established, there was hardly a purpose to pursue the
operation further. Furthermore, Operation Mongoose was designed more for
circumstances in which Fidel Castro was hostile to the United States. Operation
Mongoose was even less useful after the State Department reported that Castro had
made comments, after the missile crisis, alluding to a possible truce between the U.S.
and Cuba. His change of heart may have stemmed from his understanding of how close
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Cuba had come to being nothing more than a bargaining chip to the Soviet Union. As a
result of his epiphany, Castro attempted to slowly decrease his dependence on Soviet
supplies and the USSR as a whole. The State Department entertained his request, as
they had a reputation for favoring discourse over militancy.188 The conflict between the
United States and Cuba was long from over and Castro was never able to reconcile with
the U.S. leaders. Agencies maintained their same strategies for dealing with Cuba as
they had from the beginning.
The State Department’s willingness to hear Castro’s request and engage in a
discussion of his proposal demonstrates how the State Department kept to the same
strategy they proposed when Castro took office: to open the floor for discussion before
pursuing physical violence. Likewise, after the Bay of Pigs invasion and the missile
crisis, the CIA also did not veer from their original approach to the matter of Cuban
affairs and favored a militant response to the recent events in Cuba. They were and had
always been prepared to march into Cuba, armed and dangerous. These two agencies
had many decades to continue conjuring new ideas for foreign policy in regard to Cuba,
because Cuba prevailed, and was a thorn in the side of the United States for years to
come. The tension between the countries was so great that even when the Soviet Union
collapsed in 1991, the United States still maintained the embargo against Cuba.
Historians refer to the beginning of the 1990’s in Cuba as the “Special Period.”
This was a prolonged period in which Cuba suffered a devastating socioeconomic
collapse. The Cuban people were nearly starving and the government at times did not
have enough revenue to keep the electricity on in the Capital, let alone more remote
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areas of the island. During the Special Period, government officials made the executive
decision to conserve what little energy they had during the economic collapse and turn
on the public electric meters only during the day, so businesses could stay up and
running.
In the special period, the people living on the rural farms were mostly
untouched by the poverty that had devastated urban areas. This is widely due to the
fact that people living in rural areas whose livelihood came from agriculture were able to
grow their own food and butcher their own animals. They did not rely on imports from
superpowers like the United States or the Soviet Union. The people living in the urban
areas were the ones who struggled most. Citizens who had worked in offices or in
factories their whole lives could not feed themselves because they lacked the skills and
space to plant crops. Cuba developed an interesting system to combat the issue of
starvation. They created urban farms. City dwelling Cubans transformed vacant lots in
Havana, Santiago de Cuba, and other cities into large scale community gardens.189
Because the economy was suffering many people simply did not have the
funds to purchase items on the urban farms and thus the farms began allowing
bartering and trading. Whole neighborhoods banded together to fulfill each other’s
needs. The urban farms were one way Cuba was able to survive after the collapse of
the Soviet Union when American Presidents refused to reestablish trade with Cuba.
One could argue that the Special Period in Cuba was a golden opportunity for
the United States to reestablish dominance in the region. With Cuba struggling, they
may have been more likely to cooperate with U.S policies. The opportunity in Cuba for
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foreign business investments was at an all-time high, yet U.S. presidents during this
period did not attempt to Capitalize on Cuba’s misfortune. This could be widely due to
the fact that in order to establish agreements with another country, it was necessary to
have a diplomatic relationship with that country. Some argue that the United States
declined to recommence their diplomatic relationship with Cuba, because it would have
symbolized victory for the revolution. Further it would have represented a flawed and
weak United States. It would have been an example of how communism could trump
democracy. 190 Therefore, the United States government may have avoided
reestablishing a relationship with Cuba in order to protect its reputation and prominent
world status.
The decades passed and yet the United States never was able to overthrow or
assassinate Fidel Castro. In fact, at the summit of Latin American Presidents gathering
in 2006 Castro stated “I’m really happy to reach 80. I never expected it, not least having
a neighbor, the greatest power in the world, trying to kill me everyday.”
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was right in the sense that Castro would certainly die in Cuba before he would be
overthrown. Castro passed the presidency on to his younger brother Raul Castro in
2006 due to old age and illness.
Fidel Castro died on November 25, 2016. He was 90 years old. The world
opinion of Castro’s death was quite mixed. The Cubans in Cuba mourned, while the
Cubans in Miami celebrated. U.S. officials waited patiently to see what would come after
Castro’s death and if a turbulent page of history had finally turned. Though Fidel
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Castro’s death was not synonymous with the death of the Castro regime, it was
certainly symbolic. It was a symbol of success for the Cuban people, a symbol of
perseverance for other suppressed nations, and it was a symbol of failure to the United
States government.
For many, Fidel Castro was the revolution. Therefore, his peaceful death was a
symbol of victory for Cuba because he was never brought to his knees by an imperialist
power. He never was assassinated despite all the U.S. officials’ attempts to do so, and
he was never overthrown from by an internal rebellion. Because many Cubans view
Castro as the physical representation of the revolution, these facts applied to Cuba as
well. Revolutionary Cuba was never dominated by an imperialist power. After the Bay of
Pigs invasion, it was never again attacked violently by the United States and the
revolution was never seriously challenged by anti-Castro rebellion. Castro’s death was
mourned by many Cubans. Yet the symbolism of his peaceful death could also have
given his supporters hope and confidence for the future of the regime.
Other nations were also watching the Cuban revolution unfold. In fact, one of
the biggest worries of U.S. officials after 1959 was that Castro would export his
revolution and try to help other Latin American countries to establish revolutionary
movements. Therefore, the fact that Castro was never assassinated by and was able to
keep his revolution going for decades was inspiring for onlookers. Castro’s death served
a symbol of perseverance to other suppressed nations.
The United States government, on the other hand, was dismayed by the fact
that Castro was never taken out. He slipped through their fingers and despite their best
efforts, there was nothing that could be done about it Thus, Castro’s peaceful death in
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Havana represented total failure for the United States. The whole Cuban Revolution
was a disappointment for the United States. It was the first time the United States had
ever been embarrassed by a country so small in physical size and in the arena of global
power. The United States had triumphed in the World Wars and was idolized by the rest
of the world as an undefeatable heroic force. However, the undefeatable heroic force
that was the United States was outmaneuvered by a country it used to dominate. Cuba
was only the first of several similar embarrassments of the twentieth century. It is
evident that U.S. government officials did not learn from their undesirable encounters
with Cuba.
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Conclusion
Cuba had an unfortunate hand dealt to it from the start. It had many positive
attributes like the fertile land, the ideal climate, and its perfectly situated geographic
locations. However, all of the positive attributes were also the cause of most of Cuba’s
problems. Larger, more powerful nations preyed upon Cuba so that they too could have
access to such resources. Nations like Spain, United States, and the Soviet Union used
Cuba to propel their own interests and the latter two abandoned Cuba when there was
nothing left to gain from the small island.
After Castro nationalized U.S. businesses, the executive leaders placed an
embargo on Cuba. Cuba then became invisible to the United States in the realm of
global trade from that moment on. Cuba was similarly abandoned by the Soviet Union
during its collapse. The Soviet Union had nothing more to offer to Cuba, and thus
stopped sending supplies and ended trade as the Soviet bloc came crashing down.
Cuba, therefore, has historically never gotten along with superpowers.
However, in the grand scheme of things, Cuba has prevailed. Things might
have turned out differently had Castro not overthrown Batista, but the facts remain.
Castro did overthrow Batista and it was a revolution unlike any other. Castro united the
Cuban people under nationalist and anti-imperialist ideals. He and the masses believed
in a Cuba for the Cubans. He was able to raise the standard of living in Cuba for the
peasant class and achieve astonishing increases in literacy rates by the middle of his
rule.
However, the fact remains that Cuba remains a relatively underdeveloped
nation. In a recent trip to Cuba I witnessed much of the rural population living in humble
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conditions with few or no luxuries. The infrastructure has been weathered by the course
of time. Many buildings, roads, and bridges are dilapidated. Though Cuba did prevail
under the Castro regime, and some Cubans remained fond of Castro, there is certainly
room for improvement. Many Cubans living in the United States vowed to never go back
to Cuba until the Castro’s were out of office.
For the first few years of Castro’s rule, he maintained that he was not a
communist and even preached democratic ideals to his people. During the time in which
he had not yet declared himself a communist, he argued that the United States labeled
Cuba as communist because they needed a reason to invade. There were likely a
number of reasons why U.S. officials categorized Castro and Cuba as communist. One
reason was probably that Castro’s agrarian reform was based on the communist
principle of the redistribution of wealth. Another likely reason that the United States
government labeled Castro a communist was that there were many communist groups
operating within Cuba, and Castro allowed those groups to exist and assemble.
However, simply because there are convincing reasons to believe Castro was a
communist, does not mean that Castro was not on to an interesting theory about why
Cuba was labeled communist.
Castro’s argument that the United States used communism as a scapegoat to
invade Cuba is an interesting stance. It was certainly convenient for U.S. officials to
speculate that Fidel Castro was a communist after he had just expropriated millions of
dollars of land, resources, and businesses from the United States. Thus, it is possible
that U.S. officials sought a more compelling reason for invading a country than solely
the loss of profits. They needed to be able to justify an invasion of Cuba to the rest of
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the world and to the American people. They did not want their reputation tarnished by
overthrowing country that had long been an ally without just cause. Therefore, Fidel
suggested that the United States labeled Cuba as communist to do just that--to invent a
valid reason for an invasion.
Though it is just speculation, perhaps there is more to the story, a part that may
only become disclosed after the U.S. government declassifies more government
documents under the freedom of information act. Such declassified documents have
revealed numerous vital pieces of information, like the CIA and State Department
approaches and strategies for dealing with Cuba.
The CIA opted for a strategy that would bring Cuba to its knees and submit to
the United States’ will whereas the State Department opted for a more peaceful route.
The CIA treated Cuba like a communist enemy, while the State Department extended
Cuba more democratic courtesy. Lars Schoultz’s definition of the democratic process
bears an uncanny resemblance to how the State Department treated Cuba.
Democracy is . . . best conceived as a never-ending process of nonviolent
contestation and accommodation, a process that requires the slow, ceaseless
perfection of rules and procedures in a crowded environment where everyone
has a right to help determine who gets what, when, and how. . . Democracies
require people who know how to bargain. 192
The State Department tried numerous times to bargain with Cuba, all the while
suggesting that the United States remain within the confines of international law and
remain true to their treaty obligations. The State Department further tried to launch less
violent initiatives because they thought the outcome would be better if they slowly
deteriorated the Cuban economy, rather than staging a violent invasion.
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These two agencies strategies also withstood the test of time. The CIA director
position as well as the Secretary of State position saw rotation in the years from the
Cuban Revolution to the Missile Crisis. However, it would seem that the strategies each
agency provided for Cuba were rooted too deeply to be overturned by a new
administrator. For example, Allen Dulles, CIA director from 1953 to 1961, staged and
implemented the Bay of Pigs invasion. His predecessor, John McCone, took over in
November of 1961 and continued to plan Operation Mongoose. Operation Mongoose
was just as large of failure as was the Bay of Pigs. Therefore, it would seem that the
transition of power between Dulles and McCone had little effect on the CIA’s strategy for
dealing with Cuba.
The same was true for the State Department. There were three Secretaries of
State between 1959 and 1963: John Dulles, Christian Herter, and Dean Rusk. John
Dulles’ position as Secretary of State ended in the same month that Castro visited the
United States for the first time. Before Dulles left the State Department, he oversaw the
drafting of a document outlining how to treat Castro in his trip to the United States. The
document proposed encouraging democratic ideals and suggestive language to try and
sway Castro back closer to center on the political spectrum. There was no talk in this
memorandum about violence or conspiracy, rather just the simple art of persuasion.
Christian Herter, John Dulles’ successor, continued a similar strategy of
persuasion. In October of 1960 the State Department released a new policy for foreign
relations with Cuba, which stated that it should be made clear that the chances of a U.S.
invasion of Cuba were slim to none. The State Department followed that up by
suggesting that democratic ideals within Cuba should be encouraged and the
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consolidation of the Castro regime should be discouraged. Therefore, under Herter’s
leadership, the State Department maintained a persuasive rather than invasive
strategy.193
The third Secretary of State who falls into the scope of this study was Dean
Rusk. Rusk accepted the position as Secretary of State on Kennedy’s inauguration day.
Rusk did not share Kennedy’s desire for invasion. By the time Kennedy took office, the
planning of the Bay of Pigs invasion was already well advanced. After the invasion
failed miserably and the CIA began planning Operation Mongoose, Rusk was against it.
During the Missile Crisis, Rusk advocated for a naval blockade instead of an invasion.
In comparison, the Cuban Missile Crisis had a more favorable outcome than the Bay of
Pigs invasion. It is quite possible that the State Department’s less violent foreign policy
for Cuba could have yielded even more positive results, had it been used in place of
invasion plans.
The situation in Cuba could have had many different outcomes but the
outcome that took place was one that no one in the United States government imagined
would be the case in the early days of the Cuban Revolution. U.S. government officials
imagined that Castro and his rebels would lose momentum or fail to overthrow Batista.
When they did succeed in overthrowing the Batista regime, U.S. officials assumed
Castro could be easily defeated. They were wrong. Castro preached that Cuba would
“fight to the last man,” and his vision of the future largely prevailed.194 Against all odds,
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pinched in the middle of a contentious ideological battle between two superpowers, the
tiny island of Cuba was able to hold its own and maintain its independence to a large
degree.
What became of the United States? U.S. presidents stayed bitter toward Cuba
for the rest of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century. The embargo
stayed in place, American tourists were prohibited from traveling to Cuba, and
education in America presented a warped view of the events in Cuba to its youth. As a
middle and high school student growing up in in Wisconsin, I learned about the conflict
of Cuba through a lens tainted by bitterness. Educators at that level informed students
like me that Cuba brought their problems on themselves and dished out unwarranted
hostility to the United States. I did not learn that the struggle between the United States
and Cuba was a long contentious battle in which both sides threw punches until I was in
upper-level undergraduate courses. It was rarely mentioned that the United States
government had made decisions such as cutting the sugar quota that positively
contributed to Cuba’s growing relationship with the Soviet Union. The United States
enacted policies like this against Cuba that left Cuba with only two choices: to either let
their country crumble, with devastating consequences for the population, or to align with
the Soviet Union in order to strengthen their broken economy. Cuba chose the latter,
and the U.S. government officials and policy makers were appalled by their decision.
In the twenty-first century, Cuba and the United States entered what foreign
policy officials call a period of “normalization.” However, things are still far from normal.
The Obama administration removed some of the restrictions on Cuba and President
Obama even went to Cuba for a visit in 2016, making him the first U.S. president to visit
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Cuba in nearly nine decades. This visit, however, was only a preliminary step in what
will likely be a long road to restoring diplomatic relations with Cuba. Obama also lifted
some restrictions on American tourism in Cuba and took steps to adjust the embargo.
Still, this step represents at best a beginning. Perhaps there is a brighter chapter for
U.S. Cuban relations yet to come.
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